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AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY: THE SUPREME
COURT ON ABORTION
ROBERT M. BYRN*
"["]f the deliberate extinguishment of human life has any effect
at all, it more likely tends to lower our respect for life and brutalize
our values."'
"New York courts have already acknowledged that, in the con-
temporary medical view, the child begins a separate life from the
moment of conception."2
I. INTRODUCTION
ON January 22, 1973, in the companion cases of Roe v. Wade' and
Doe v. Bolton,4 the Supreme Court of the United States declared
that unborn children are not persons under section one of the fourteenth
amendment. Basing its decision on a right of personal privacy to choose
whether or not to abort, the Court held further that a state may not enact
abortion legislation protecting unborn children for the period of gestation
prior to the time the children are said to be "'viable,' that is, potentially
able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid. Viability
is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier,
even at 24 weeks." '5
Wade arose out of a challenge to the Texas abortion statutes.' Texas
law incriminated all abortions except those "procured or attempted by
medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother."' In the
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.. 238, 303 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
2. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 App. Div. 2d 316, 324, 329
N.Y.S.2d 722, 729 (2d Dep't) (citations omitted), aff'd on other grounds, 31 N.Y.2d 194,
286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972), appeal dismissed, 93 S. Ct 1414 (1973).
3. 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
4. 93 S. CL 739 (1973).
5. 93 S. Ct. at 730 (footnotes omitted). Actually, viability is now placed at twenty
weeks, and it is generally recognized that the term signifies, not a qualitative characteristic
of the unborn child, but the ability of technology to keep the child alive outside the womb
in an artificial life support system. The child is as much alive before viability as after. See
Byrn, Abortion-on-Demand: Whose Morality?, 46 Notre Dame Law. 5, 12-13 (1970) [here-
inafter cited as Byrn]. Although Justices Rehnquist and White dissented in Wade and
Bolton, they did not challenge the Court's holding that unborn children (even after viability)
are not persons under section one of the fourteenth amendment. See 93 S. Ct. at 736
(Rehnquist, ., dissenting); Id. at 762 (White, J., dissenting).
6. Tex. Penal Code Ann. arts. 1191-96 (1961). However, art. 1195 was not challenged. 93
S. Ct. at 709 n.1.
7. Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 1196 (1961).
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district court,8 several plaintiffs, including Roe, a pregnant woman,' had
sought a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the Texas abortion laws
and a permanent injunction against enforcement on the ground that the
statutes "deprive married couples and single women of the right to choose
whether to have children, a right secured by the Ninth Amendment."' 0
The three-judge district court agreed, 1' and also found the statutes un-
constitutionally vague. 2 However, the court refused to issue the injunc-
tion. 3 Plaintiffs appealed the denial of the injunction, and the Supreme
Court determined that it had jurisdiction to deal not only with the injunc-
tion issue, but also with the merits of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims.14
Bolton arose out of a similar challenge to the Georgia abortion stat-
utes. 5 Georgia law incriminated all abortions except those which, in the
best clinical judgment of a duly licensed physician, were necessary be-
cause continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the life of the preg-
nant woman or would seriously and permanently injure her health; or
the fetus would very likely be born with a grave, permanent, and irreme-
diable mental or physical defect; or the pregnancy resulted from forcible
or statutory rape.' 6 In the district court,' T numerous plaintiffs, including
Doe, a pregnant woman,' 8 had (as in Wade) sought a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the Georgia abortion laws and a permanent injunc-
tion against enforcement. Their claims were more extensive than in
Wade. In addition to alleging vagueness and invasion of the right of
privacy, the plaintiffs asserted that the statutes unconstitutionally restric-
ted the right of physicians and others to practice their professions, and
also discriminated against the poor.' 9 The three-judge district court, find-
8. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (NJ). Tex. 1970).
9. Id. at 1220.
10. Id. at 1219. There have been a number of similar challenges to state abortion laws,
many of them in federal courts and some of them were cited in Wade. See 93 S. Ct. at
727-28. For the most part, discussion of these cases has been avoided in this article because
obviously they did not bind the Supreme Court in Wade. The Court had to consider the
merits of the various constitutional claims de novo. Its decision supersedes all others and it is
that decision which is under scrutiny here.
11. 314 F. Supp. at 1221-23.
12. Id. at 1223. The Supreme Court did not reach the issue of vagueness. 93 S. Ct. at
732. But see United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
13. 314 F. Supp. at 1225 (1970).
14. 93 S. Ct. at 712.
15. Ga. Code Ann. §§ 26-1201 to -1203 (1972).
16. Id. § 26-1202(a). Thirteen other states have statutes similar to Georgia's and all
are based on Model Penal Code § 230.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See 93 S. Ct. at 720
n.37. Four states have repealed criminal sanctions on abortions during particular periods of
the pregnancy. Id. The remaining states have statutes similar to the Texas law. Id. at 709 n.2.
17. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
18. Id. at 1057.
19. Id. at 1051.
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ing that "the concept of personal liberty embodies a right to privacy which
apparently is also broad enough to include the decision to abort a preg-
nancy,220 struck down the substantive portions of the Georgia statutes;
left standing certain procedural and medical standards; and refused to
issue an injunction.21 Plaintiffs appealed the last two rulings, and the
Supreme Court, having passed on the substantive constitutional issues in
Wade, restricted its opinion to a finding of the unconstitutionality of the
standards. In both Wade22 and Bolton,' the Court refused to reverse the
denial of the injunction2 4
The writer has long maintained that unborn children are in all respects
live human beings protected by section one of the fourteenth amendment,
particularly the equal protection clause.'- In an opinion replete with error
and fraught with dangerous implications, the Supreme Court in Wade
found to the contrary. It is with these issues that this article is concerned.2 1
Roe v. Wade is in the worst tradition of a tragic judicial aberration that
periodically wounds American jurisprudence and, in the process, irrepara-
bly harms untold numbers of human beings. Three generations of Amer-
icans have witnessed decisions by the United States Supreme Court which
explicitly degrade fellow human beings to something less in law than
"cpersons in the whole sense."' One generation was present at Scott
v. Sandford,28 another at Buck v. BellV- and now a third at Roe v. Wade.
Are not three generations of error enough?
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE Wade OPINION AND THE SPECIFIC
HOLDINGS OF THE COURT
Parts I through IV of the Wade opinion contain an analysis of the
Texas anti-abortion statutes, a history of the action, a justification of the
20. Id. at 1055 (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 1056-57.
22. 93 S. Ct. at 733.
23. Id. at 752.
24. It is to be noted that § 26-1202(e) of the Georgia Criminal Code contains a "con-
science" clause protecting hospitals and doctors who refuse to participate in abortions.
The Court in Bolton at least inferentially approved this section. 93 S. Ct. at 750.
25. See, e.g., Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y2d 194, 286 N.E2d
887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972), appeal dismissed, 93 S. Ct. 1414 (1973); Report of the
Governor's Commission Appointed to Review New York State's Abortion Law, Minority
Report 47, 51-56, 67-68 (1968); Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 Duquesne L. Rev. 12S,
126-29, 134-35 (1966).
26. Since Bolton does not deal with these issues, that decision will be referred to only
in so far as it clarifies some substantive point in Wade.
27. 93 S. Ct. at 731.
28. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
29. 274 US. 200 (1927).
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Court's inquiry into the merits, and a decision on the issues of justiciabil-
ity, standing and abstention."
Part V sets up the basic contention of the appellants that "the Texas
statutes... invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman,
to choose to terminate her pregnancy," a right which appellants would
discover "in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause; or in per-
sonal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said to be protected by the Bill
of Rights or its penumbras ...or among those rights reserved to the
people by the Ninth Amendment .... ,,31
Before addressing this claim, the Court felt "it desirable briefly to sur-
vey, in several aspects, the history of abortion, for such insight as that
history may afford us, and then to examine the state purposes and interests
behind the criminal abortion laws."8 2 The historical survey in Part VI of
the opinion covers "Ancient attitudes," "The Hippocratic Oath," "The
Common Law," "The English statutory law," "The American law," "The
position of the American Medical Association," "The position of the Amer-
ican Public Health Association," and "The position of the American Bar
Association."3
3
In Part VII, the Court analyzed the three reasons usually advanced "to
explain historically the enactment of criminal abortion laws in the 19th
century and to justify their continued existence."' The first reason, not
advanced by Texas and which "no court or commentator has taken ...
seriously," 5 is to discourage illicit intercourse. The second is the protec-
tion of the pregnant woman against a hazardous medical procedure, an
interest which because of "[m]odern medical techniques" has "largely
disappeared," at least for the period of pregnancy "prior to the end of the
first trimester," although "the State retains a definite interest in protecting
the woman's own health and safety when an abortion is proposed at a
late stage of pregnancy."8 The third reason "is the State's interest-some
phrase it in terms of duty-in protecting prenatal life."
8 7
Parts VIII (the pregnant woman's "right of privacy" to decide whether
or not to abort), IX (the absence of a compelling state interest in the
30. 93 S. Ct. at 709-15. Jurisdiction, justiciability, standing and abstention are outside
the scope of this article.
31. Id. at 715.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 715-24. Since this article is concerned with Anglo-American law, there is no
need to comment on the Court's analysis of ancient attitudes and the Hippocratic Oath.
34. Id. at 724.
35. Id. (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 725. An inquiry as to whether abortion is truly safe in the first trimester is
outside the scope of this article.
37. Id.
[Vol. 41
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"fetus" as a legal person or a human life or both), and X (the residual
interests of the state in safeguarding the pregnant woman against the
health hazards of a late abortion and in protecting the "potentiality of
life" after viability) contain the Court's decision on the merits. The
Court held: first, the "right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth
Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy; ""
second, "this right is not unqualified and must be considered against im-
portant state interests in regulation; "40 third, the right of privacy being a
"fundamental right," regulation limiting it may be justified only by a
"compelling state interest," and restrictive legislation "must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake;"'" fourth,
Texas urges that it has a compelling state interest in protecting the fetus'
right to life as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment4 2 but "the word
'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the un-
born;" 4" fifth, Texas urges "that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment,
life begins at conception and is present throughout pregnancy, and that,
therefore, the State has a compelling interest in protecting that life from
and after conception,"" but "[w] e need not resolve the difficult question
of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus,
the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not
in a position to speculate as to the answer,"4 and, "the unborn have never
been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense; "40 sixth, "we do
not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas may override the
rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake; " 47 seventh, a state "does
have an important and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting
the health of the pregnant woman,"4 however, this interest does not reach
38. Id. at 726-32.
39. Id. at 727.
4o. Id.
41. Id. at 728. Justice Rehnquist in dissent objected that the compelling state interest
test applies to the equal protection clause, not the due process clause. Id. at 737 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 728.
43. Id. at 729 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 730.
45. Id.





the "compelling" point until approximately the end of the first trimester, 49
from and after which "a State may regulate the abortion procedure to
the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and
protection of maternal health;"10 but "for the period of pregnancy prior
to this 'compelling' point, the attending physician, in consultation with his
patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that in his
medical judgment the patient's pregnancy should be terminated. If that
decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free
of interference by the State; ""' eighth, a state has an important and legiti-
mate interest in "protecting the potentiality of human life," 2 but this in-
terest does not reach the "compelling" point until viability,"' and "[i] f the
State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far
as to proscribe abortion during that period except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother; '*4 ninth, the Texas statute
"sweeps too broadly," and "cannot survive the constitutional attack made
upon it here; 5" tenth, no decision is made with respect to the father's
rights, if any, in the abortion decision, or the rights, if any, of the parents
of an unmarried pregnant minor; 6 eleventh, since a state "may, if it
chooses," enact legislation restricting abortion within the limits set forth
above,"' it follows that the state may, if it chooses, repeal all laws restrict-
ing abortion, and allow "the potentiality of life" to be destroyed up to the
moment of birth.
With respect to unborn children, the Wade decision means at a mini-
mum: that an unborn child is neither a fourteenth amendment person nor
a live human being at any stage of gestation; an unborn child has no right
to live or to the law's protection at any stage of gestation; a state may not
protect an unborn child from abortion until viability; after viability, a
state may, if it chooses, protect the unborn child from abortion, but an
exception must be made for an abortion necessary to preserve the life or
health of the mother; and finally, health having been defined in Doe v.
Bolton to include "all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial,
and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient," 8 it fol-
lows that a physician may with impunity equate the unwantedness of a
49. Id. at 731-32.
50. Id. at 732; see text accompanying note 36 supra.
51. 93 S. Ct. at 732.
52. Id. at 731.
53. Id. at 732.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 733 n.67.
57. Id. at 732-33
58. Id. at 747.
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pregnancy with a danger to the pregnant woman's health-emotional,
psychological or otherwise. Thus, even after viability, there is little that
a state can do to protect the unborn child.
III. THE FUNDAMENTAL ERRoRs IN Wade: IN GENERAL
Upon analysis, it becomes evident that the structure of the Court's opin-
ion in Wade is defective. The Court agreed that if the fourteenth amend-
ment personhood of the unborn child were established, "the appellant's
case, of course, collapses, for the fetus' right to life is then guaranteed
specifically by the Amendment." 9 Hence, the approach of the Court
should have been to decide: (a) whether the unborn child, as a matter of
fact, is a live human being, (b) whether all live human beings are "per-
sons" within the fourteenth amendment, and (c) whether, in the light
of the answers to (a) and (b), the state has a compelling interest in the
protection of the unborn child, or to put it another way, whether there are
any other interests of the state which would justify denying to the unborn
child the law's protection of his life. Instead, the Court reversed the in-
quiry, deciding first that the right of privacy includes a right to abort,
then deciding that the unborn child is not a person within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment, and finally, refusing to resolve the factual
question of whether an abortion kills a live human being. In effect, the
Court raised a presumption against the constitutional personality of un-
born children and then made it irrebuttable by refusing to decide the basic
factual issue of prenatal humanbeingness.
The refusal to resolve the threshold question of fact at the outset is
the crucial error in Wade. There is a" 'long course of judicial construction
which establishes as a principle that the duty rests on this Court to decide
for itself facts or constructions upon which federal constitutional issues
rest.' "1 This fundamental error may have been caused by the Court's
misapprehension of the common law of abortion and the motivation behind
early American anti-abortion statutes. This, in turn, apparently led the
Court to forego researching the intent of the framers of the fourteenth
amendment: to bring within the aegis of the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses every member of the human race, regardless of age, im-
perfection or condition of unwantedness. Left without any reliable histori-
cal basis for constitutional interpretation, the Court both failed to allude
59. Id. at 728. This statement quite dearly and correctly means that the xight of
personal privacy is subordinate to the fourteenth amendment right to life. Hence, the key
question is whether the unborn child is a human being-cum-human person. If so, then
the right of privacy does not include the right to abort.
60. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 (1959) (footnote omitted), quoting Kern-
Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110, 121 (1954).
19731
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to its own prior explication of "person" under section one of the four-
teenth amendment and mistook the general status in law of unborn chil-
dren. Further, it adverted to a number of criteria which it erroneously
interpreted as proof that the unborn child is not a person at all under the
fourteenth amendment. In short, error was piled upon error.
IV. THE HISTO CAL ERRORS
At the very beginning of its opinion in Wade, the Supreme Court an-
nounced:
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement free of
emotion and of predilection. We seek earnestly to do this, and, because we do,
we have inquired into, and in this opinion place some emphasis upon, medical and
medical-legal history and what that history reveals about man's attitudes toward
the abortive procedure over the centuries. 61
At the end of the opinion, the Court concluded that its holding was con-
sistent "with the lessons and example of medical and legal history" and
"with the lenity of the common law .... 1
It is evident that the Court's finding that unborn children are not four-
teenth amendment persons was deeply influenced by its own interpreta-
tion of history, which, for all practical purposes, was dictated by an un-
critical acceptance of two law review articles by abortion advocate Cyril
Means. 3 Unfortunately, the Court's understanding of the Anglo-American
history of the law of abortion is both distorted and incomplete. Because
these errors are so significant and because they span a period beginning
in the thirteenth century and extending into the twentieth, a major portion
of this article must be devoted to them.
The following are the Court's key historical observations:
It is undisputed that at the common law, abortion performed before "quickening"-
the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the
16th to the 18th week of pregnancy-was not an indictable offense .... 04
[I]t now appear[s] doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a
common law crime even with respect to the destruction of a quick fetus.05
61. 93 S. Ct. at 709.
62. Id. at 733.
63. Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment
Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-
Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971); Means, The Law of New York
Concerning Abortion and the Status of the Foetus, 1664-1968: A Case of Cessation of
Constitutionality, 14 N.Y.L.F. 411 (1968). The Supreme Court referred to these articles
respectively as "Means II" and "Means I," and they are so cited hereinafter.
64. 93 S. Ct. at 716 (footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 718.
[Vol. 41
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* . It was not until after the War Between the States that legislation began gen-
erally to replace the common law ... 66
It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Con-
stitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed
with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing
it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy
than she does in most States today ....
Parties challenging state abortion laws ... claim that most state laws were de-
signed solely to protect the woman ...The few state courts called upon to inter-
pret their laws in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the State's
interest in protecting the woman's health rather than in preserving the embryo and
fetus.68
All this, together with our observation, ... that throughout the major portion of
the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today,
persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not
include the unborn. 69
The historical picture painted by the Court is one of a "right" to abort,
extending from the earliest common law, through most of the nineteenth
century in America, until the post-Civil War enactment of abortion stat-
utes (which, in the Court's view, were intended for the pregnant woman's
protection and not that of her unborn child) and being completely unim-
paired by the fourteenth amendment. At issue, therefore, is the status of
abortion--or more accurately, the status of the unborn child-at common
law, under nineteenth century American abortion statutes, and under
the fourteenth amendment.
A. The Common Law
It has been claimed, alternatively, that abortion was not a crime at all
at common law, but a "freedom" of the pregnant woman, or that abortion
was a crime only after quickening. Ergo, the unborn child is not a four-
teenth amendment person.70 These claims obviously influenced the Court
in Wade. The more plausible view of the common law is to the contrary;
namely: (a) even the earliest common law cases do not support the prop-
osition that abortion was regarded as a "liberty" or "freedom" or "right"
of the pregnant woman or anyone else; (b) "quickening" was utilized in
the later common law as a practical evidentiary test to determine whether
the abortion had been an assault upon a live human being in the womb
66. Id. at 720.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 725-26 (footnotes omitted).
69. Id. at 729 (footnote omitted).
70. See note 63 supra.
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and whether the abortional act had caused the child's death; this eviden-
tiary test was never intended as a judgment that before quickening the
child was not a live human being; and, (c) at all times, the common law
disapproved of abortion as malum in se and sought to protect the child in
the womb from the moment his living biological existence could be proved.
Anglo-Saxon law before the Norman Conquest penalized abortion civilly
in the form of heavy fines, and ecclesiastically in the form of penances.1'
In the thirteenth century, abortion of a fetus "formed [or] animated, and
particularly if it be animated," was condemned as homicide by Bracton
72
and, later in the same century by the anonymous legal writer, Fleta,
although Fleta used the term "formed and animated."78
The biologists of the thirteenth century taught that a new life, biolog-
ically separate from the mother, came into being (animation) when the
fetal body assumed a recognizable human form (formation), approxi-
mately forty days after conception (eighty days in the case of a female) .7
This being the science of the day, Bracton's use of the term formed or
animated is somewhat puzzling. It is possible that he meant to leave open
the question of whether animation might occur at some time before for-
mation in deference to Christian teaching which condemned all abortion, 71
although biologically, philosophically and canonically, an abortion after
formation was regarded as a much more serious offense. On the other hand,
it is probably unfair to argue that Bracton incorporated into secular law
a concept not supported by contemporary secular science. His use of the
disjunctive "or" and the phrase "and particularly if it be animated" may
have been intended only to emphasize that abortion was a crime against
human life. Fleta understood Bracton to mean that formation and anima-
tion coincided ("formed and animated") and Bracton has been so trans-
lated.76
Biology led the way in the thirteenth century, and other disciplines,
including law and ethics followed. Though Bracton was a canonist, the
canon law of abortion was itself the product of current biological thought.
Bracton appears to be the common law's first interdisciplinarian, using
71. G. Grisez, Abortion: The Myths, The Realities, and the Arguments 186-87 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Grisez].
72. Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 Geo. L.J. 395, 431
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Quay].
73. Id.
74. J. Noonan, Contraception 88-91, 216-17 (1966); Means I, supra note 63, at 411-12;
Quay, supra note 72, at 426-31.
75. See J. Noonan, An Almost Absolute Value in History, in The Morality of Abortion:
Legal and Historical Perspectives 1 (J. Noonan ed. 1970).
76. 2 H. Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae 278-79 (T. Twiss ed. 1879).
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secular science as the basis for rational law, updating the disapproval of
abortion that had existed even prior to the Norman Conquest.
Common law judges and lawyers from the fourteenth century onward
faced a major problem: how to accommodate Bracton's substantive crime
to the practical requirements of proof that the aborted woman had been
pregnant, that the aborted child had been alive, and that the abortional
act had killed the child.
Pro-abortion writers rely on two fourteenth century cases to "prove"
that abortion was a treasured common law freedom of medieval English
women." One might easily question the relevance of the fourteenth cen-
tury to the fourteenth amendment. Still, if one thing is certain about the
two cases, it is that they do not support the pro-abortion contention.
As translated by Professor Means, the earlier case (1327) reads as
follows:
Writ issued to the Sheriff of Gloucestershire to apprehend one D. who, according to
the testimony of Sir G[eoffrey] Scrop[e] [the Chief Justice of the King's Bench],
is supposed to have beaten a woman in an advanced stage of pregnancy who was
carrying twins, whereupon directly afterwards one twin died, and she was delivered of
the other, who was baptized John by name, and two days afterwards, through the in-
jury he had sustained, the child died: and the indictment was returned before Sir G.
Scrop[e], and D. came, and pled Not Guilty, and for the reason that the Justices v,ere
unwilling to adjudge this thing a felony, the accused was released to mainpernors,
and then the argument was adjourned sine die. [T]hus the writ issued, as before stated,
and Sir G. Scrop[e] rehearsed the entire case, and how he [D.] came and pled.
Herle: to the sheriff: Produce the body, etc. And the sheriff returned the writ to
the bailiff of the franchise of such place, who said, that the same fellow was taken
by the Mayor of Bristol, but of the cause of this arrest we are wholly ignorant.18
When the defendant originally appeared before King's Bench, and the
"justices were unwilling to adjudge this thing a felony," he was released
to mainpernors (akin to bail) and the argument was adjourned sine die.
The writ was not dismissed. The report of the case, then, is not the report
of the original proceedings before King's Bench but of subsequent pro-
ceedings. It is evident that the Chief Justice of King's Bench (Scrope)
was reporting the prior action of King's Bench to another judicial body.
Herle, who ordered the sheriff to produce the body after hearing Scrope's
account of the prior proceedings, was not a member of King's Bench,
but was the Chief Justice of the Common Bench. The presence and inter-
vention of the Chief Justice of the Common Bench are explicable only if
these subsequent proceedings were before the King's Council; otherwise,
they are not.
77. See, e.g., Means II, supra note 63, at 336-41.




The King's Council, among its other functions, served as a body of
consultation and advice for justices who were experiencing legal difficulty
in deciding a case."9 The justices of the realm were ex officio members of
the Council,"0 which operated at times either as a conference of judges,"1
or as an alternative to the King's Bench."2 Moreover, the Council gave
attention to anything that, because of the incompleteness of the law,
required, in whole or in part, exceptional treatment.83
It is most probable that in 1327 the justices of King's Bench consulted
the Council for assistance in deciding a case of first impression, as they
attempted to interpret and apply Bracton and Fleta. The need to resort
to the Council would explain the adjournment sine die and the admission
of defendant to bail at the original proceedings before King's Bench.8'
However, since the arrest of the defendant on another charge precluded
further proceedings, the Council's instruction was not forthcoming and
no final disposition was made of the case. It is authority for nothing except
the unwillingness of the court to let the abortionist go unpunished and the
justices' puzzlement over how properly to deal with him. Subsequent his-
tory would suggest that the justices' dilemma was rooted in problems of
proof. Had the abortionist's act really been the cause of the stillbirth?
Had the two-day-old twin died from the abortion or some other cause?
The next reported abortion case was decided in 1348. Like the 1327
case, it helps the pro-abortionists not at all. As translated by Professor
Means, the report reads as follows:
One was indicted for killing a child in the womb of its mother, and the opinion
was that he shall not be arrested on this indictment since no baptismal name was
in the indictment, and also it is difficult to know whether he killed the child or not,
etc.
8 5
The court did not dismiss the indictment on the ground that abortion
was not an offense at common law. Indeed, if that were the case, there
79. Select Cases Before the King's Council 1243-1482, at xvii-xvii (I. Leadam & J. Bald-
win eds. 1918).
80. Id. at xvi.
81. Id. at xxi-xxil.
82. Id. at xxii.
83. Id. at xxvi.
84. "Moreover a case before the justices might become a case before the council not by an
appeal or change of venue, but by a postponement until the council ... should assemble." Id.
at xx. It is to be noted that after the accession of Edward III in January, 1327, King's
Bench, perhaps unsure of its authority, refused to impose criminal penalties in some cases
with the result that the King called the Council to York to decide on what should be done
to restore normal proceedings. Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench Under Edward II,
xiv-xv (G. Sayles ed. 1957). It was while the Council (including Scrope and Herle) was
at York that the proceedings in the 1327 case occurred.
85. Means II, supra note 63, at 339, translating Y.B. Mich. 22 Edw. 3 (1348).
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would have been no indictment at all, or the indictment would have been
dismissed expressly on that ground. Rather, the inference is that abortion
was a substantive offense, but the indictment had to be dismissed for a
defect in pleading (no baptismal name) and an impossibility of proof (the
cause of the child's death)."'
The 1327 case merely demonstrates the dilemma of the justices in at-
tempting to apply Bracton's rule in a case of first impression. The infer-
ence in the 1348 case is that abortion was a crime but difficulties in plead-
ing and proof barred prosecution and conviction. 7 Certainly there is
nothing in these cases to suggest that abortion was regarded as a "freedom."
Sixteenth century writers"8 were persuaded by these difficulties to state,
as a practical matter, that abortion was not a crime. Then, in the seven-
teenth century, a way was found to satisfy the proof requirements, at
least for some abortions.
The seventeenth century, as an era of abortion law reform, began with
R. v. Sirnsa wherein it was said that if an aborted child were born alive
with marks of the abortion and then died, it was murder, but if the child
were stillborn, there was no murder because it could not be known
"whether the child were living at the time of the batterie or not, or if the
batterie was the cause of the death .... ."I' The Sims live-birth-murder
doctrine provided only a minor solution to the problems of proof which
were highlighted and reiterated in the remainder of the Sims rule.
Later in the seventeenth century, Coke attempted to contribute a
further solution:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a Potion or otherwise killeth it in her
86. It is not only in abortion cases that problems of proof of causation prevented a con-
viction for the killing of a human being. At common law, a defendant could not be con-
victed of a homicide if his victim died more than a year and a day after the assault, the
theory being that after that time, it was impossible, given the state of medical knowledge,
to prove that the defendant's assault had been the cause of the victim's death. R. Perkins,
Criminal Law 28-29 (2d ed. 1969). Of course, despite this rule, the substantive common law
of homicide remained intact. So too, despite the difficulties in proof in abortion cases at
common law, the clear inference from the 1348 case is that a substantive crime of abortion
did exist.
87. It is probably for this reason that the canonical courts took jurisdiction of the offense.
It is interesting, however, that there were apparently no abortion prosecutions in the
canonical courts after the sixteenth century. Means I, supra note 63, at 439. In the seven-
teenth century, the common law began to find solutions to the problems of proof.
88. For example, Staundford and Lambard, two sixteenth-century writers, seem to have
denied the existence of abortion as a crime. It is generally accepted that they took this posi-
tion because of the historical difficulty in proving the crime, and the resulting paucity of
indictments for abortion. See Davies, Child-Killing in English Law, 1 Modern L. Rev. 203
(1937).
89. 75 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B. 1601).
90. Id. at 1076.
1973]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe dieth in her body, and she is deliv-
ered of a dead childe, this is a great misprison [misdemeanor], and no murder:
but if the childe be born alive, and dieth of the Potion, battery, or other cause, this
is murder: for in the law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura,
when it is born alive.91
The Supreme Court in Wade, in effect, accuses Coke, as attorney
general in Sims92 and as author of the Third Institute, of inventing the
crime of abortion in defiance of the 1327 and 1348 cases.93 An analysis
of Coke's rules in the light of prior and contemporary law reveals that
the accusation is without merit. As already pointed out, the 1327 and
1348 cases are not contrary to the substantive law propounded by
Bracton and Fleta. Also, the live-birth-murder rule in Sims, which Coke
adopted and which undisputably became fixed in English law, 4 is in
accord with Bracton and Fleta. Moreover, in limiting the misdemeanor
of abortion to a woman "quick with childe," Coke cited Bracton and
Fleta.95 It seems likely, therefore, that he meant to identify "quick with
childe" with "formed and animated." He did, however, depart from the
earlier authorities by classifying the crime as a serious misdemeanor
rather than murder. The modification probably resulted from difficulties
in proving that the stillbirth was the result of the abortion. Finally,
Coke's statement that the child is accounted "in rerum natura, when it
is born alive," is sometimes misinterpreted to mean that the common law
viewed the unborn child as something less than a live human being. But
when one examines the subsequent interpretation of Coke by English
courts, one is led to conclude that Coke was referring only to the law of
homicide where the exigencies of proof prevented labelling the intra-
uterine killing a murder. For other purposes, such as inheritance, the
unborn child was recognized as a person in rerum natura in the womb.
For instance, it was held in Wallis v. Hodson:9"
The principal reason I go upon in the question is, that the plaintiff was in ventre sa
mere at the time of her brother's death, and consequently a person in rerum natura,
so that both by the rules of the common and civil law, she was, to all intents and
purposes, a child, as much as if born in the father's life-time.97
Wallis v. Hodson relied, inter alia, on Beale v. Beale9s wherein Lord
91. E. Coke, Third Institute 50 (1644).
92. Coke was attorney general in 1601 and may have been the "Cook" mentioned in R. v.
Sims.
93. 93 S. Ct. at 718 & n.26.
94. See R. v. West, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 500 (1848).
95. E. Coke, Third Institute 50 (1644).
96. 26 Eng. Rep. 472 (Ch. 1740).
97. Id. at 473.
98. 24 Eng. Rep. 373 (Ch. 1713).
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Chancellor Harcourt specifically cited Coke's abortion rules as authority
for finding a posthumous child "to be living at her father's death in ventre
sa mere.M
9
That Coke regarded the unborn child as a human being in esse is
implicit in the live-birth-murder rule. At common law, crime was "gen-
erally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with
an evil-doing hand .... "100 The rule of concurrence means that the
victim of the abortional act must have been a human being at the time
of the act-that is, while he was intrauterine, though his subsequent
death was extrauterine-or else the mind and hand of the defendant
could not have concurred to produce a homicide.
Coke's abortion rules are in accord with prior law and with the con-
temporary status in law of the unborn child as a human being in esse
prior to birth, at least from formation and animation. His innovations
were not substantive, but evidentiary, and in this respect, it is clear that
"common law doctrines are not frozen for criminal cases any more than
civil cases .. .."10o Any inconsistency between Coke and the 1327 and
1348 cases is procedural, not substantive. However, Coke's characteriza-
tion of an abortion-cum-stillbirth as a great misdemeanor, though good
substantive law, did little to solve the problem of proving that the child
had been alive when the abortion occurred, or even in some cases, that
the woman had been pregnant.
The seventeenth century legal commentator, Sir Matthew Hale, pro-
vided another approach to the problem of proof in his posthumously
published History of the Pleas of the Crown. Hale differed with Coke
on whether abortion of a woman "quick or great with childe," resulting
in a live birth and subsequent death of the child, was murder. Citing the
1327 and 1348 cases, he stated that the abortion "is not murder nor
manslaughter by the law of England because [the child] is not yet in
rerum natura, tho it be a great crime .... .M0
2
The generally accepted view is that Hale took this position, as Staund-
ford and Lambard had before him, because of the evidentiary difficulty
in proving the crime." 3 On the other hand, Hale did characterize abor-
tion as a "great crime." It has been argued that Hale was referring to an
ecclesiastical crime.' Another plausible view, consistent with the clear
inference in the 1348 case which Hale cites, is that Hale recognized
99. Id.
100. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
101. United States v. Schoefield, 465 F.2d 560, 561 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. CL
210 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
102. 1 M. Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown 433 (1736) (hereinafter cited as Hale].
103. Davies, supra note 88, at 209 & n.23.
104. Means H, supra note 63, at 350, 368-69.
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abortion as a common law crime, but was unwilling for the moment to
identify it as either a felony or a misdemeanor, perhaps because of dis-
agreement with Coke on the degree of the offense. Weight is lent to this
interpretation when one considers an example of murder given elsewhere
by Hale:
But if a woman be with child, and any gives her a potion to destroy the child
within her, and she takes it, and it works so strongly, that it kills her, this is murder,
for it was not given to cure her of a disease, but unlawfully to destroy her child
within her, and therefore he that gives a potion to this end, must take the hazard,
and if it kill the mother, it is murder, and so ruled before me at the assizes at Bury
in the year 1670.105
It has been argued that "unlawfully to destroy the child within her"
refers incidentally to ecclesiastical illegality, and the case for murder
rests entirely on the foreseeable danger to the woman from taking the
abortifacient. 106 But this cannot be so. The abortionist "must take the
hazard" specifically because "he gives a potion to this end [of destroying
the child]."' Thus, it is the mens rea of intending to destroy a child
and the actus reus of giving the potion which combine to make the death
of the woman murder. The only logical conclusion is that Hale regarded
abortion as a great enough secular crime to condemn the abortionist as
a felony-murderer when the pregnant woman died from the abortion
attempt. Further, it apparently makes no difference when, in the course
of the pregnancy, the abortion takes place. While Hale had earlier used
the term "quick or great with child" in connection with the death of a
child, he merely specified "with child" in connection with the death of
the woman. (It seems apparent that while Coke used "quick with child"
to mean formed and animated, Hale employed the term to mean quicken-
ing.)
Such was the interpretation given to Hale in People v. Sessions:10 8
At common law life is not only sacred but it is inalienable. To attempt to produce
an abortion or miscarriage, except when necessary to save the life of the mother
under advice of medical men, is an unlawful act and has always been regarded as fatal
to the child and dangerous to the mother. To cause death of the mother in procuring
or attempting to procure an abortion is murder at common law.' 00
Thus, at the end of the seventeenth century the law of abortion appears to
have been as follows. First, an abortion of a woman "quick with child"
105. Hale, supra note 102, at 429-30; accord, R. v. Whitmarsh, 62 J.P. 1711 (1898).
106. Means II, supra note 63, at 362-63.
107. Hale, supra note 102, at 430.
108. 58 Mich. 594, 26 N.W. 291 (1886).
109. Id. at 596, 26 N.W. at 293 (citations omitted); accord, State v. Harris, 90 Kan.
807, 136 P. 264 (1913) (containing an extensive review of the abortion-homicide cases In
a number of states); State v. Farnam, 82 Ore. 211, 161 P. 417 (1916).
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resulting in the live birth and subsequent death of the child was either
murder or "a great crime." Second, an abortion of a pregnant woman
"quick with child" resulting in a stillbirth was a "great misprison."
Third, an abortion of a pregnant woman, at any stage of pregnancy,
which resulted in her death, was felony murder. Fourth, every unborn
child was "a person in rerun natura" at common law except that prob-
lems of proof precluded such a designation in criminal abortion situa-
tions. Fifth, at the very least, abortion was regarded as malum in se, a
secular wrong to the unborn child, and can hardly be said to have been
considered a "freedom" of the pregnant woman. Sixth, the 1327 and
1348 cases are not contrary to any of these rules.
Eighteenth century legal scholars set out to solve the remaining prob-
lems of proof by identifying "quick with child" with some observable,
evidentiary phenomenon in the gestational period. Hawkins agreed with
Coke's statement of the crime of abortion but substituted "big with
child" for quick with child.110 Blackstone, at one point in his Commen-
taries, stated: "To kill a child in its mother's womb, is now no murder,
but a great misprision: but if the child be born alive, and dieth by reason
of the potion or bruises it received in the womb, it seems ... to be
murder in such as administered or gave them [citing Hawkins and
Coke].'m In another part of the Commentaries, Blackstone stated:
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual; and
it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's
womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it in
her womb; or if any one beat her, whereby the child dieth in her body, and she is
delivered of a dead child; this, though not murder, was by the ancient law homicide
or manslaughter [citing Bracton]. But [Sir Edward Coke] doth not look upon this
offence in quite so atrocious a light but merely as a heinous misdemeanor.112
It is evident that Blackstone intended only to restate Coke. Coke had
apparently equated "quick with child" with Bracton's "formed and
animated," and, in citing both authors, Blackstone seems also to have
equated the two terms. Possibly influenced by the inference of movement
in "animated" and "quick," Blackstone identified the beginning of hu-
man life as the point at which the child "is able to stir in the mother's
womb." The child is able to stir in the womb as early as the eighth to
tenth week of gestation, but ordinarily the pregnant woman does not
feel the child's movement (quickening) until the fifth month-although
being purely subjective, this will vary with each woman. 1 3 Thus, even
110. 1 W. Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, ch. 31, § 16 (7th ed. 1795)
[hereinafter cited as Hawkins].
111. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *198.
112. 1 id. at *129-30.
113. See Byrn, supra note 5, at 9-10.
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given Blackstone's interpretation of Coke and Bracton, it must be noted
that "quick with child" is not the same as "quickening."
Of course, in the eighteenth century, the only way to prove that the
child had stirred was to prove that the mother had felt him stir. Thus,
the practical exigencies of proof would ultimately require that for the
purposes of an abortion conviction, "quick with child" be identified with
"quickening," and this may have been what Blackstone intended.
The first English abortion statute, enacted in 1803, imposed greater
penalties for an abortion of a woman "quick with child" than one per-
formed on a woman "not being, or not being proved to be, quick with
child.""14 The latter crime still required proof of pregnancy,"" and since
"quick with child" probably meant "formed and animated,""' the statute
provided the first clear abortion protection in English law for the pre-
formed child." 7
The first case decided under the statute is also the first case clearly to
enunciate the quickening rule. In Anonymous,'" the court held:
[The woman] ... swore, however, that she had not felt the child move within her
before taking the medicine, and that she was not then quick with child. The medical
men, in their examinations, differed as to the time when the foetus may be stated
to be quick, and to have a distinct existence: but they all agreed that, in common
understanding, a woman is not considered to be quick with child till she has herself
felt the child alive and quick within her, which happens with different women in
different stages of pregnancy, although most usually about the fifteenth or sixteenth
week after conception.
Lawrence, J. said, this was the interpretation that must be put upon the words quick
with child in the statute; and as the woman in this case had not felt the child alive
within her before taking the medicine,--he directed an acquittal.110
The court recognized the dichotomy between "quick with child" and
"quickening," but chose quickening as the practical norm in the face of
conflicting medical testimony as to "when the foetus may be stated to be
quick, [alive] and to have a distinct existence ... . 2o If there bad been
114. 43 Geo. 3 ch. 58, § 2 (1803).
115. R. v. Scudder, 172 Eng. Rep. 565, 566 (N.P. 1828).
116. Davies, The Law of Abortion and Necessity, 2 Modern L. Rev. 126, 134 (1938).
117. The purpose of the preformation branch of the statute is not really known. It may
have been to protect the pregnant woman from the criminal abortionist, Means II, supra
note 63, at 358, or it may reflect an increased sensitivity to the unborn child's right to life
at all stages of gestation. It is interesting that in the very year (1803) that the statute was
enacted, Thomas Percival's influential work on medical ethics appeared wherein Percival
condemned all abortions except those done for theraputic reasons, insisting on the In-
violatability of even "the first spark of life." Grisez, supra note 71, at 190 (citing T. Percival,
Medical Ethics 134-35 (Leake ed. 1927)).
118. 170 Eng. Rep. 1310 (N.P. 1811).
119. Id. at 1311-12.
120. Id. at 1312.
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available to the court uncontested medical testimony establishing the
distinct, living existence of the unborn child at a stage earlier than
quickening, the court obviously would have followed that evidence.
Quickening was a flexible standard of proof-not a substantive judgment
on the value of unborn human life.' 12
At this time, the details of human conception were still unknown. The
doctrine of formation and animation remained a carryover from the an-
cient idea that the male inseminated the female by implanting a seed
which grew within her in distinct stages. Not until formation could a new,
distinct, separate life be said to exist. (Even then, in the absence of quick-
ening, definitive proof of the separate living existence of the unborn child
was lacking.) It was only when the ovum was discovered in 1827 that the
true nature of conception, as co-semination instantly producing a new life,
was understood." 2
The discovery of the ovum apparently had its effect. In 1837, Parlia-
ment enacted a new abortion statute which deleted the requirement of
pregnancy and imposed a common penalty for all abortional acts.lea All
problems of proof were solved and the unborn child was effectively pro-
tected from the moment of conception. In 1838, an English courtl2 4 re-
interpreted the ancient common law rule which forbade the execution of
a death sentence upon a woman "quick with child." The court instructed
the jury: "'Quick with child' is having conceived. 'With quick child' is
when the child has quickened."'125 The term "quick with child," which had
meant formed and animated, now meant from the moment of conception.
121. That "quickening" was understood to have entered the law essentially as an
evidentiary test is apparent from the language in Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86 (1872): "But
until the period of quickening there is no evidence of life; and whatever may be said of the
foetus, the law has fixed upon this period of gestation as the time when the child is endowed
with life, and for the reason that the foetal movements are the first clearly marked and
well defined evidences of life." Id. at 90 (citation omitted).
122. Andre Hellegers, M.D., quoted in Catholic News, Mar. 15, 1973, at 11, coL 3.
123. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict., c. 85 (1837).
124. R. v. Wycherley, 173 Eng. Rep. 486 (N.P. 1838).
125. Id. at 487. The rule of temporary reprieve of a pregnant woman from execution is
of ancient origin. A pregnant woman condemned to death would, according to Coke, be
granted a reprieve if she were "quick with childe . . . till she delivered, but she shall have
the benefit of that but once, though she be again quick with childe." E. Coke, Third Insti-
tute 17-18 (1644). Coke distinguished "quick with childe" from pregnancy, but it must be
remembered that when Coke used "quick with childe" in his abortion section, he cited
Bracton and evidently meant "formed and animated." Hale, on the other hand, employs
"quickening" in his version of the reprieve from execution rule. Hale, supra note 102, at
368-69. Blackstone also noted the reprieve rule and stated: "This is a mercy dictated by
the law of nature, in favorem prolis .... execution shall be staled generally till the next
session; and so from session to session, till either she is delivered, or proves by the course of
nature not to have been with child at all. But if she once hath had the benefit of this reprieve,
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From Bracton's time, the common law had striven to protect the un-
born child against abortion from the moment science was able to establish
the child's individuated, living, biological existence. The effort reached
fruition in the 1830's when law and science cooperated to complete the
protection of the child at every stage of gestation.
and been delivered, and afterwards becomes pregnant, she shall not be entitled to the
benefit of a farther respite for that cause. For she may now be executed before the child is
quick in the womb; and shall not, by her own incontinence, evade the sentence of justice."
4 Blackstone, Commentaries *395 (footnote omitted). Two things are to be noted about Black-
stone's statement of the reprieve rule: first, Blackstone ameliorated Coke's statement concern-
ing a second pregnancy after the reprive. Coke stated that the woman would be executed even
though she were then quick with child. Blackstone observed that the execution would In-
evitably occur before the pregnancy reached that stage. Thus he showed a more mature
sensitivity to the right of the child; second, whatever Blackstone may have meant by quick
with child in his abortion section, in the reprieve section he seems to be referring to formed
and animated, not to quickening. If quickening had occurred, there would be little doubt
that the woman was with child, but Blackstone notes that the execution shall be stayed
until the woman delivers "or proves by the course of nature not to have been with child at
all." Id. at *395. Hence, he is referring to a stage in pregnancy earlier then quickening.
The dichotomy between "quickening" in abortion and "quick with child" in reprieve cases
made sense. In an abortion case, the benefit of the doubt was with the defendant and the
burden of proof on the prosecution. Quickening was thus an evidentiary sine qua non for
conviction. On the other hand, in the execution cases, the benefit of doubt was with the child
even to the extent that the woman might not have been pregnant at all. The distinction
between the stages of gestation in the abortion and reprieve situations is made even clearer
by Hawkins. For the crime of abortion, the woman must be "big with child." Hawkins,
supra note 110, ch. 31, § 16. For a reprieve, she must be "quick with child." 4 Id. at ch. 51, § 9.
Thus, "quick with child" seems to be an earlier stage than that which will satisfy the
evidentiary requirements of an abortion conviction "big with child". In Anonymous, 170 Eng.
Rep. 1310 (N.P. 1811), the dichotomy is even clearer. In R. v. Wycherley, 173 Eng. Rep. 486
(N.P. 1838), the court interpreted "quick with child" as "having conceived." It appears that
the only case after Wycherley that equated "quick with child" with a point in pregnancy
later than conception is R. v. Webster, reported in Note, A jury of Matrons, 9 Cent. L.J. 94
(1879). However, the case is dubious. As the note writer observed, "[tjhe plea of pregnancy
in arrest of execution took the learned judge by surprise, and the discussion between the bench
and the bar shows that the proceeding was unusual to all concerned." Id. In Common-
wealth v. Spooner, discussed in 2 P. Chandler, Amer. Crim. Trials 3 (reprint 1970), a 1778
Massachusetts case, a condemned woman claimed to be several months advanced in pregnancy,
but the jury of matrons and mid-wives, after two examinations, reported that she was not
"quick with child." Id. at 48-49. An autopsy after execution revealed "a perfect male foetus,
of the growth of five months ... ." Id. at 53. Chandler attributes the incident to the "preju-
dice, or ignorance, or malice" of the jury. Id. at 54. Peleg Chandler published his American
Criminal Trials between 1841 and 1844. In the reports of the Spooner case, he cited the
"having conceived" definition of "quick with child" in R. v. Wycherley as the latest (and
presumably the most authoritative) English rule. Id. at 56 n.1. In State v. Arden, 1 S.C. 196,
1 Bay 487 (1795), the prisoner "pleaded pregnancy" when asked why sentence of death should
not be passed upon her. A jury of matrons examined the prisoner and "found that she was
not pregnant." Id. at 197, 1 Bay at 490. Perhaps the emphasis was on pregnancy rather than
"quick with child," because the court had heard of, and was appalled by, the Spooner in-
cident of 1778.
THE SUPREME COURT ON ABORTION
For the Supreme Court in Wade to conclude that at common law "a
woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy
than she does in most States today" 2 ' is incomprehensible. A lack of
criminal prosecution cannot be translated into an historic right. At com-
mon law, larceny by false promise was not a crime,'-" but few would
claim a thief "enjoyed a broader right" to commit a fraudulent larceny
than he does today.
For the Supreme Court in Wade to cite the "lenity" of the common law
as a basis for holding that unborn children do not possess a fundamental
right to live and to the law's protection at any time up to birth, is a per-
version of Bracton, Coke, Hale, Hawkins and Blackstone. The whole his-
tory of the common law cries out against the jurisprudence of Wade.
B. The American Statutes
During the nineteenth century, several states interpreted the common
law so as to render abortion criminal at all stages of pregnancy.128 The vast
majority of states, however, were in accord with the interpretation of
the common law inferential in Anonymous,'"0 that there was no practi-
cal way to prosecute an abortion prior to quickening.120 No state held
that an abortion after quickening was not a crime, and indeed, the
quickening requirement seems to have been limited to the criminal law,
the unborn child being regarded in other areas of the law as a human being
in esse from the moment of conception.13'
Almost all the then existing states enacted abortion statutes during the
nineteenth century. 32 Relying on the Means articles," and citing only
Although the New York State Legislature employed pregnant with a "quick child" in the
Revised Statutes of 1829 to define the crime of manslaughter for aborting an unborn child
(Law of Dec. 10, 1828, part IV, ch. 1, tit. 2, § 9, [1828] N.Y. Rev. Stat. 661), the term
"quick with child" was used in the reprieve section (Law of Dec. 10, 1828, part IV, ch. 1, tiL
1 §§ 21-22, [1828] N.Y. Rev. Stat. 659). In 1872, the court of appeals affirmed that "quick
with child" means having conceived. Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86, 89 (1872).
The whole evolution of the reprieve rule was toward the protection of the child at an
stages of gestation, and the purpose of the rule is "to guard against the taking of the life of
an unborn child for the crime of the mother." Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 US. 250, 253
(1891).
126. 93 S. Ct. at 720.
127. See Chaplin v. United States, 157 F.2d 697, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1946).
128. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 45 Ark. 333 (1885); State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 630 (1880);
Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 630 (1850).
129. See text accompanying notes 118-21 supra.
130. The cases are collected in Roe v. Wade, 93 S. CL at 718 n.27.
131. Hall v. Hancock, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 255, 257-58 (1834).
132. The statutes are listed in the dissenting opinion of ir. Justice Rehnquist in Roe
v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. at 738-39 nn.1 & 2. The legislative history of the state statutes is detailed
in Quay, supra note 72, at 447-520.
133. 93 S. Ct. at 725 n.47.
1973]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
an 1858 New Jersey case,'84 the Supreme Court in Wade commented:
"The few state courts called upon to interpret their laws in the late 19t1
and early 20th centuries did focus on the State's interest in protecting th(
woman's health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus."'88 The
best that can be said of this statement is that it is absolutely wrong. Fo
instance, the Supreme Court might have noted with respect to New Jersey:
"This law was further extended March 26th, 1872 ... to protect the life
of the child also, and inflict the same punishment, in case of its death, as
if the mother should die;"'"6 and with respect to Alabama: "[D]oes not
the new being, from the first day of its uterine life, acquire a legal and
moral status that entitles it to the same protection as that guaranteed to
human beings in extrauterine life?' 8 7 and with respect to Colorado, that
the statute was "intended specially to protect the mother and her unborn
child from operations calculated and directed to the destruction of the
one and the inevitable injury of the other."' These decisions, rendered
prior to 1918, did not involve quickening as an issue in the court's inter-
pretation of the intent of the statute.
Had the Supreme Court in Wade been interested in cases decided after
the early nineteenth century and before the abortion "reform" movement
of the 1960's, it might have noted with respect to Idaho: "[T]he abor-
tion statute is not designed for the protection of the woman . . . only
of the unborn child and through it society ... ;"I" and with respect to
Oklahoma: "We hold that the anti-abortion statutes in Oklahoma were
enacted and designed for the protection of the unborn child and through
it society;"' 4° and with respect to Virginia, that the Virginia abortion stat-
ute was intended "to protect the health and lives of pregnant women and
their unborn children from those who intentionally and not in good faith
would thwart nature by performing or causing abortion and miscar-
134. State v. Murphy, 27 N.J.L. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1858).
135. 93 S. Ct. at 725-26 (footnote omitted).
136. State v. Gedicke, 43 N.JJ.. 86, 90 (Sup. Ct. 1881) (citation omitted).
137. Trent v. State, 15 Ala. App. 485, 488, 73 So. 834, 836 (1916), cert. denied, 198 Ala.
695, 73 So. 1002 (1917), quoting, in the context of the purpose of the Alabama abortion
statute, from Transactions Medical Association of Alabama 265-72 (1911).
138. Dougherty v. People, 1 Colo. 514, 522 (1872). In addition, for similar Interpreta-
tions of the abortion statutes of other states, see the following cases: State v. Miller, 90
Kan. 230, 233, 133 P. 878, 879 (1913); State v. Tipple, 89 Ohio St. 35, 40, 105 N.E. 75, 77
(1913) ; State v. Ausplund, 86 Ore. 121, 132, 167 P. 1019, 1022 (1917); State v. Howard,
32 Vt. 380, 399 (1859). One might fairly add to this list Iowa and Michigan where courts, In
the abortion context, termed as "sacred" and "inalienable" the lives of unborn children. See
State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 135-36 (1868) (discussed infra at notes 198-202); People v.
Sessions, 58 Mich. 594, 596, 26 N.W. 291, 293 (1886).
139. Nash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 292, 31 P.2d 273, 276 (1934) (citation omitted).
140. Bowlan v. Lunsford, 176 Okla. 115, 117, 54 P.2d 666, 668 (1936).
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riage; " 4 and with respect to Washington, that the Washington abortion
statute was "designed to protect the life of the mother as well as that of
her child."'" Again, in none of these decisions was quickening a factor.
Other state courts dearly implied that their respective abortion statutes
had as one of their purposes (at the very least) the protection of unborn
children. As early as 1851, the Maine Supreme Court noted with approval
that its statute had changed the common law by eliminating quickening:
"There is a removal of the unsubstantial distinction, that it is no offence
to procure an abortion, before the mother becomes sensible of the motion
of the child, notwithstanding it is then capable of inheriting an estate; and
immediately afterwards is a great misdemeanor."1 3 In 1887, the Maryland
Court of Appeals commented on the growing dissatisfaction with the com-
mon law quickening criterion which many courts were abrogating by re-
interpretation of the common law, and which Maryland had changed by
statute.1 In 1907, the Nebraska Supreme Court interpreted its state
abortion statute, which provided the same penalty for causing the death
by abortion of the woman or the child, to apply at every stage of preg-
nancy,' 45 thus indicating the high value the legislature placed on the life
of the unborn child even prior to quickening. Indiana had a similar stat-
ute.146
It is regrettable, indeed, that the Court's exposition in Wade of nine-
teenth and early twentieth century judicial expressions of legislative in-
tent did not carry it past State v. Murphy.47 Perhaps the explanation is
to be found in the fact that this is the only early American case (outside
of New York) cited by Means. 48
141. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 665, 673, 58 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1930).
142. State v. Cox, 197 Wash. 67, 77, 84 P.2d 357, 361 (1938).
143. Smith v. State, 33 Me. 48, 57 (1851).
144. Lamb v. State, 67 Md. 524, 532-33, 10 A. 208 (1887).
145. Edwards v. State, 79 Neb. 251, 112 N.W. 611 (1907).
146. See Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338, 339 (1881). One might fairly add Utah to
this list. See State v. Crook, 16 Utah 212, 51 P. 1091 (1898), wherein the court characterized
abortion under the Utah statutes as "the criminal act of destroying the foetus at any time
before birth . . . ." Id. at 217, 51 P. at 1093. But see Foster v. State, 182 W"Ls. 298, 196
N.W. 233 (1923).
147. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
148. Means I, supra note 63, at 452. Even Murphy is doubtful in its statement of legisla-
tive purpose. The New Jersey statute, with which Murphy was concerned, was enacted in
1849 after the New Jersey Supreme Court had held that abortion prior to quickening was
not a common law crime. State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52 (1849). The Cooper court focused
almost exclusively on the status of the unborn child. The evil to be suppressed was the killing
of a human being in utero. The Wade Court might have derived greater support from State
v. Carey, 76 Conn. 342, 56 A. 632 (1904), and State v. Jordon, 227 N.C. 579, 42 S.E.2d 674
(1947), both holding that their states' abortion statutes were intended to protect the pregnant
woman, not the child. But see Conn. Public Act No. 1, May 1972 Spec. Sess. (1972) (Con-
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Professor Means' focus is almost exclusively on New York and he ar-
gues that the early history of New York abortion statutes proves that
they were intended only to protect the woman and not the child. However,
an analysis of the statutes leads more logically to the conclusion that the
unborn child was at least one of the intended beneficiaries of the statutes'
protection.
The first New York abortion statutes were enacted as part of the Re-
vised Statutes of 1829. Two different sections condemned abortional acts.
The first section dealt with successful abortions of a quick child and the
second with all other abortional acts, successful or not:
Every person who shall administer to any woman pregnant with a quick child, any
medicine, drug or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument or other
means, with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless the same shall have been
necessary to preserve the life of such mother, or shall have been advised by two
physicians to be necessary for such purpose, shall, in case the death of such child or
of such mother be thereby produced, be deemed guilty of manslaughter in the second
degree. 149
Every person who shall wilfully administer to any pregnant woman, any medicine,
drug, substance or thing whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument or other
means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman,
unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such woman, or
shall have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for that purpose; shall,
upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment in a county jail not more than one
year, or by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.150
The two sections were evidently modeled after the English abortion
statute of 1803. 11' The influence of Anonymous appears in the adoption
of quickening as the key for distinguishing the provable beginning of
human life.
It has been claimed that the general abortion section of the Revised
Statutes (section 21) was intended solely for the protection of the preg-
nant woman against a dangerous medical procedure and was not for the
protection of the unborn child. But there are compelling reasons for reach-
ing a contrary conclusion.
necticut abortion law), the preamble of which states: "The public policy of the state and
the intent of the legislature is to protect and preserve human life from the moment of con-
ception ... ;" State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 630 (1880), wherein the Supreme Court of North
Carolina held that abortion was a common law crime in North Carolina at all stages of
gestation.
149. N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1829), pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 2, § 9 [hereinafter referred to in the text
as section 9]. The bracketed material was added by Law of Apr. 20, 1830, pt. IV, ch. 320,
§ 58 (1830).
150. N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1829), pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 21 [hereinafter referred to in the text
as section 21].
151. See Means I, supra note 63, at 449-50.
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First, there is no question that the postquickening section (section 9), in
characterizing as manslaughter the killing of a quick child by abortion,
was intended to protect the life of the child. The section provided an ex-
emption to criminal liability where the abortion "shall have been neces-
sary to preserve the life of such woman, or shall have been advised by two
physicians to be necessary for such purpose."'1 2 The exemption is ex-
tremely stringent. The child's life was considered so precious, that in the
view of the legislature, it could not be sacrificed to a lesser value than life
itself.
On the other hand, if the exemption in the general abortion section (sec-
tion 21) had been designated solely to protect the mother's health, with-
out regard to the value of the child's life, it would certainly have been
phrased less stringently than the exemption in the postquickening section.
Yet the two exemptions are identical. The general abortion section, like the
postquickening section, places the highest value on the child's life.
Second, the less stringent exemption is found in a section proposed by
the revisers and rejected by the legislature. This section was expressly
intended for the preservation of health:
Every person who shall perform any surgical operation, by which human life shall
be destroyed or endangered, such as the amputation of a limb, or of the breast, tre-
panning, cutting for the stone, or for hernia, unless it appear that the same was
necessary for the preservation of life, or was advised, by at least two physicians,
shall be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor. 153
Here, indeed, one finds the more liberal exemption which he would have
expected to find in the general abortion section if that section had not
been intended to protect the child. There is no crime in proposed section
28 if "it appear that the same was necessary for the preservation of life,
or was advised, by at least two physicians .... ,15' The italicized words
are significantly different from the phraseology of the exemption in the
abortion sections (sections 9 and 21). An abortion was non-culpable: (a)
if it "shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such woman"ia'
152. N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1829), pt. IV, ch. 1, Ut. 6, § 21.
153. Proposed section 28, pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 28 [hereinafter referred to in the text
as proposed section 28]. The Revisers' Note stated: "The rashness of many young practi-
tioners in performing the most important surgical operations for the mere purpose of
distinguishing themselves, has been a subject of much complaint, and we are advised by old
and experienced surgeons, that the loss of life occasioned by the practice, is alarming. The
above section furnishes the means of indemnity, by a consultation, or leaves the propriety of
the operation to be determined by the testimony of competent men. This offence is not in-
cluded among the mal-practices in manslaughter, because, there may be cases in which the
severest punishments ought not to be inflicted. By making it a misdemeanor, and leaving the
punishment discretionary, a just medium seems to be preserved."
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1829), pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 21.
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(not merely if "it appear" to have been so necessary), or, (b) if it "shal
have been advised by two physicians to be necessary for that purpose"'1
(not merely that it "was advised, by at least two physicians").'57
The purpose of sections 9 and 21 was manifestly different from thi
proposed surgical section.5 ' That different purpose could only be the pro
tection of the unborn child, or else the less stringent exemption in th(
surgical section would also have been written into the abortion sections
Then too, it is noteworthy that the abortion sections were enacted whi
the proposed surgical section was not.
Third, it is also significant that the New York State Legislature, ir
adopting the Revised Statutes of 1829, employed quickening ("quick
child") as the key pregnancy factor in section 9, the abortion-manslaughtex
section, but used the term "quick with child" in the section providing fox
a reprieve from execution of a woman "quick with child" who was under
a sentence of death.159 In 1872, the New York Court of Appeals, relying
on R. v. Wycherley,1 ° distinguished quickening from "quick with child,"
defining the latter as having conceived. 101 Apparently, the intent of the
legislature in 1829 was to protect the unborn child from execution with
his mother at all stages of gestation. If the legislature so recognized the
value of the life of the child prior to quickening in the reprieve section,
must we not conclude that at least one of the purposes of the concurrently
enacted abortion sections (sections 9 and 21) was the protection of the
child's life against a would-be abortionist?
Fourth, prior to 1829 two significant events had occurred. The ovum
had been discovered in 1827, and, for the first time, the details of human
conception were well understood. 0 2 In 1823, the Becks, in their standard
work on medical jurisprudence published in New York, had condemned
the quickening doctrine for its failure to take cognizance of the fact that
the unborn child is alive before he is felt to move." It may be that these
events also influenced the legislature to incriminate abortion prior to
quickening.
In 1867, the Medical Society of New York condemned abortion at every
stage of gestation, as "murder."'4 The Society's resolution was sent to
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. Proposed section 28, pt. lV, ch. 1, tit. 6, § 28.
158. It is to be noted that the abortion section included both surgery and drugs.
159. N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1829), pt. IV, ch. 1, tit. 1, §§ 21-22.
160. See note 124 supra and accompanying text.
161. Evans v. People, 49 N.Y. 86, 89 (1872).
162. See text accompanying note 122 supra.
163. I.T. Beck & R. Beck, Elements of Medical Jurisprudence 276-77 (1823), cited in
Grisez, supra note 71, at 191.
164. See Means I, supra note 63, at 459.
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the New York State Legislature which, in 1869, amended the abortion
statutes and proscribed as manslaughter an abortion of a "woman with
child" which resulted in "the death of such child, or of such woman."' c
It seems as reasonable to connect the 1867 resolution with the 1869
statute as to pretend that the legislature was completely unmotivated by
the Medical Society's strong condemnation of abortion as "murder."
Adverting to the common law quickening rule and its evidentiary basis,
the court of appeals in 1872, in Evans v. People, conservatively inter-
preted "with child" to mean a child after quickening 10 The legislature
restored the quickening requirement in the 1881 re-codification of the
Penal Law, and included a general abortion section which did not require
that the woman be pregnant. 1 7 As a result of these enactments, the unborn
child remained protected under a provision which avoided the evidentiary
ruling in Evans.
Nothing in Evans can be regarded as a justification for legalizing abor-
tion prior to quickening or as precedent for a holding that the unborn
child is a non-person under section one of the fourteenth amendment.
With respect to abortion, Evans merely reiterated a somewhat outdated
rule of evidence as a basis for interpreting a statute.
On the other hand, the Evans court's approval of the reprieve from exe-
cution rule of R. v. Wycherley signifies an awareness of the fundamental
rights of all unborn children regardless of age. In this respect, Evans
supports the proposition that nineteenth century New York abortion
legislation was intended to protect the unborn child at every stage of
gestation.
Whether one chooses to concentrate only on New York or to look also
to the judicial pronouncements of other states, one must conclude that the
better view of nineteenth century abortion legislation is that a major pur-
pose was the protection of unborn children without regard to age. Bolster-
ing this view is the twentieth century abortion indictment at the Nuern-
berg Trials. 68 The indictment charged, inter alia, that "[e] astern women
workers were induced or forced to undergo abortions," 11 and hence one
might conclude that the trial and judgment are irrelevant to the discus-
sion herein. Yet the shadow of a generation of aborted children darkened
Nuernberg. In addition to testifying that the abortions had all been volun-
tary on the part of the aborted women, one of the defendants thought it
165. Law of May 6, 1869, ch. 631, [1869J N.Y. Laws 92d Sess. 1502.
166. See note 121 supra.
167. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 80, 1050 (McKinney 1944) (repealed). These were the sec-
tions enacted in 1881.
168. U.. v. Greifelt, 4 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military
Tribunal 608 (Government Printing Office) (1946-1949).
169. Id. at 613.
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relevant to argue: "Interruption of pregnancy is or was never considered
as murder, but it was considered a special violation against life. Generally
this incurs considerably milder punishment than if it were murder. UP to
now nobody had the idea to see in this interruption of pregnancy a crime
against humanity."170
It is possible that the defendant thought it necessary to argue that
abortion is de minimis because the prosecution had introduced into evi-
dence a captured German document (dated October 30, 1943) which
commented on the "objections of a minority of reactionary Catholic
physicians" to the decree on interruptions of pregnancy of female eastern
workers and female Poles.171 The doctors had many objections but the
first one mentioned is: "These physicians argued that the decree was not
in accordance with the moral obligation of a physician to preserve life. M7 2
At Nuernberg, the prosecution and the defense joined issue on the
unborn child's right to live. And the prosecutor, in addition to arguing
that the abortions had been "encouraged and even forced on these
women," emphasized in his closing brief:
Abortions were prohibited in Germany under Article 218 of the German Penal
Code .... After the Nazis came to power this law was enforced with great severity.
Abortions were also prohibited under the Polish Penal Code ... , and under the
Soviet Penal Code. But protection of the law was denied to unborn children of the
Russian and Polish women in Nazi Germany. Abortions were encouraged and even
forced on these women.' 73
The right of the unborn child to the law's protection was a litigated
issue even though it was outside the scope of the indictment and not
mentioned in the subsequent judgment. Neither prosecution nor defense
could ignore the aborted children who stood as mute and invisible accusers
at the trial. On behalf of the United States, an American prosecutor con-
demned the defendants before a court composed of American judges
because "protection of the law was denied to the unborn children.' 7 4
On the eve of the abortion "reform" movement of the 1960's, a Michi-
gan court could observe that American abortion statutes had been amended
to delete the obsolete quickening dichotomy (which had persevered as a
170. Id. at 1090 (testimony of defendant Richard Hildebrandt) (emphasis added). See
Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. at 729 n.54: "Further, the penalty for criminal abortion specified
by Art. 1195 is significantly less than the maximum penalty for murder prescribed by Art.
1257 of the Texas Penal Code. If the fetus is a person, may the penalties be different?"
171. U.S. v. Greifelt, 4 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunal
608, 1082 (Government Printing Office) (1946-49) (emphasis deleted).
172. Id. at 1082.
173. Id. at 1077 (emphasis added).
174. Id. But see Roe v. Wade, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
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norm for determining the punishment for abortion) because of the recog-
nition of a child's legal existence while en ventre sa mere.Y7 And even so
ardent an advocate of legalized abortion as the English legal commen-
tator, Glanville Williams, had to admit that the contemporary rationale
of anti-abortion legislation was this: "The fetus is a human life to be
protected by the criminal law from the moment when the ovum is fer-
tilized. 2 17 6
The Supreme Court in Wade was as wrong about the motivation behind
nineteenth century abortion legislation as it was about the common law.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment
The early American abortion statutes were a continuum of the striving
of the common law to protect human life from its very beginning. When,
with the discovery of the ovum in 1827, science clearly identified con-
ception as the beginning of life, the law began to move its protection
back to the earliest stages of gestation, and penalize abortional acts prior
to quickening without, in some cases, even requiring proof of pregnancy.
Quickening began to disappear, first as a practical norm for initial crim-
inality and then as a factor calling for increased punishment.'"
The Supreme Court in Wade admitted that "[t]he anti-abortion mood
prevalent in this country in the late 19th century was shared by the
medical profession. Indeed, the attitude of the profession may have
played a significant role in the enactment of stringent criminal abortion
legislation during that period."'"" In 1859, an American Medical Asso-
ciation Committee on Criminal Abortion, appointed to investigate crim-
inal abortion with a view to its suppression, criticized the quickening
criterion of criminality and "the grave defects of our laws, both common
and statute, as regards the independent and actual existence of the child
before birth, as a living being."7 On the basis of the report, the Asso-
ciation adopted resolutions protesting "'against such unwarrantable de-
struction of human life,' calling upon state legislatures to revise their
abortion laws, and requesting the cooperation of state medical societies'
in pressing the subject.' "'8'
175. LaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 567, 100 N.W.2d 445, 450 (1960).
176. G. Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law 149 (1957).
177. Indeed, from the scientific point of view, quickening has no relevance at all today.
See Byrn, supra note 5, at 9-12. See, e.g., State v. Sudol, 43 NJ. Super. 481, 129 A.2d 29,
cert. denied, 25 N.J. 132, 135 A.2d 248, cert. denied, 355 US. 964 (19S7) (stating that
modem science has advanced to a point that a court is justified in taking judicial notice of
the accuracy of a confirmed pregnancy test).
178. 93 S. Ct. at 721.
179. Id., quoting 12 Transactions of the Am. Med. Assn. 73-77 (1859).
180. Id., quoting 12 Transactions of the Am. led. Assn. 28, 78 (1859).
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In 1867, the Medical Society of New York condemned abortion at
every stage of gestation as "murder." ' In 1868, Francis Wharton urged
the injustice of the quickening distinction in abortion statutes (as he had
in earlier editions of his treatise on criminal law) and argued that unborn
children should be protected regardless of gestational age.182
In 1871, the AMA Committee on Criminal Abortion submitted an-
other report in which it concluded: "We had to deal with human life. In
a matter of less importance we could entertain no compromise. An honest
judge on the bench would call things by their proper names. We could
do no less." '
Whatever may be said of the common law and the early nineteenth
century, it is evident that in the period from 1859 to 1871, spanning a
war fought to vindicate the essential dignity of every human being and
the subsequent ratification of the fourteenth amendment in 1868, the
anti-abortion mood prevalent in the United States can be explained only
by a desire to protect live human beings in the womb from the beginning
of their existence.' When the fourteenth amendment was ratified in
1868, the law of at least twenty-eight of the thirty-seven states of the
United States incriminated abortional acts prior to quickening-two by
common law,'85 and the remainder by statute. 80 In the next fifteen years,
one additional state (Colorado) entered the United States and at least
seven more states incriminated pre-quickening abortional acts.1 87
As previously indicated, the overwhelming weight of authority is to
181. See note 164 supra and accompanying text.
182. 2 F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 210-12 (6th ed.
1868).
183. 93 S. Ct. at 721, quoting 22 Transactions of the Am. Med. Assn. 258 (1871). But see
93 S. Ct. at 730: "We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge,
is not in a position to speculate as to the answer." No subsequent medical or bar association
statement cited by the Court in Wade denies that abortion takes a "human life." See Id. at
721-24.
184. Even in the slavery days of 1858, the legal personhood of unborn children was not
unfamiliar. In Bailey v. Poindexter's Ex'r, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 132 (1858), counsel for the
executor drew an analogy between the legal status of slaves and, inter alia, unborn children,
in support of the enforceability of a choice given slaves under testator's will to choose to be
sold or set free. In answer, opposing counsel argued: "[Married women] may take estates
by deed or will. So may infants even in ventre sa mere, or idiots, or lunatics. They are all
free persons, though under partial or temporary disabilities. To reason in favor of similar
powers, rights or capacities in slaves, on the ground of analogy, is to plunge at once into a
labyrinth of error." Id. at 171.
185. State v. Reed, 45 Ark. 333 (1885); State v. Slagle, 83 N.C. 630 (1880).
186. The states and statutes are collected in Quay, supra note 72, at 447-520.
187. See id.
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the effect that at least one of the purposes of these statutes was the pro-
tection of unborn children at all gestational stages. The fourteenth
amendment era, which finally saw the extension of the equal protection
clause to aliens and corporations in the 18 80 's"e and, during the same
period, witnessed the expression of a new liberality in interpretation of
basic constitutional guarantees,' was an era of solicitude for the basic
right of the unborn child to live no matter what his gestational age might
be, and without regard to "quickening."
Given the background of the fourteenth amendment, this solicitude
should come as no surprise. The evil, for which the due process and
equal protection clauses were designed as a remedy, is typified in the
arguments of counsel in Bailey v. Poindexter's Executor,0 0 wherein a
provision in a will that testator's slaves could choose between emancipa-
tion and sale was held void on the ground that slaves had no legal
capacity to choose. In support of the position, counsel argued:
These decisions are legal conclusions flowing... from the one dear, simple, funda-
mental idea of chattel slavery. That fundamental idea is, that, in the eye of the law,
so far certainly as civil rights and relations are concerned, the slave is not a person,
but a thing. The investiture of a chattel with civil rights or legal capacity is indeed a
legal solecism and absurdity. The attribution of legal personality to a chattel slaver--
legal conscience, legal intellect, legal freedom, or liberty and power of free choice
and action, and corresponding legal obligations growing out of such qualities, faculties
and action-implies a palpable contradiction in terms.19'
The court agreed with the arguments of counsel that the slave is prop-
erty and "has no civil rights or privileges,"' - and the court, in dictum,
went on to observe that the social right of "protection from injury" is
limited to free persons.'
This, then, was the evil: human beings were degraded to the status of
property, without civil rights-without even the right to the law's pro-
tection of their lives-unless the legislature, by policy decision, should
grant it to them.
Slavery typified the evil, but the remedy was not limited to slaves
alone. It was the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment that
never again would any human being be deprived of fundamental rights
by an irrational and arbitrary classification as a non-person.'" Thus,
188. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); County of Santa Clam v. Southern Par.
RR., 18 F. 385, 397-98 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883), aft'd, 118 US. 394 (1886).
189. See Boyd v. United States, 116 US. 616, 635 (1886).
190. 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 132 (1858).
191. Id. at 142-43.
192. Id. at 191.
193. Id. at 191-92.
194. "All history shows that a particular grievance suffered by an individual or a class,
19731
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Congressman John A. Bingham, who sponsored the amendment in the
House of Representatives, noted that it was "universal" and applied to
"any human being."'05g Congressman Bingham's counterpart in the Senate,
Senator Jacob Howard, emphasized that the amendment applied to every
member of the human race:
It establishes equality before the law, and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, the
most despised of the race the same rights and the same protection before the law as
it gives to the most powerful, the most wealthy, or the most haughty.100
The Court in Wade made no reference to the intent of the framers.
Had it done so, in the context of a proper understanding of what had
originally motivated the enactment of state abortion legislation, how could
it have excluded unborn children from personhood under the due process
and equal protection clauses? It was certainly less than consistent for
the Court, on the one hand, to admit that the nineteenth century AMA
anti-abortion statements may have played a significant role in the passage
of restrictive abortion legislation, and on the other hand, to find, in
effect, that the framers of the fourteenth amendment acted in defiance of
both the 1859 AMA statement and state legislation, and deliberately
created an unarticulated right of privacy which included the right to kill
unborn children whom the framers intended to exclude from fourteenth
amendment protection. If that had been the intent of the framers, one
could hardly imagine three-quarters of the state legislatures ratifying the
amendment while they were at the same time contemplating (or had al-
ready enacted) restrictive abortion legislation designed to protect unborn
human children--especially if such legislation was the product of the
AMA statements cited by the Court. Then too, what evidence is there
that the framers did not share "[t]he anti-abortion mood prevalent in
this country in the late 19th century... ?,,111
Statutory law, common law and the prevalent mood converged in an
Iowa case decided in 1868, the year in which the fourteenth amendment
was ratified. State v. Moore"" affirmed a conviction of murder for caus-
ing the death of a woman by an illegal abortion. The trial court had
charged the jury:
To attempt to produce a miscarriage, except when in proper professional judgment
it is necessary to preserve the life of the woman, is an unlawful act. It is known to
from a defective or oppressive law, or the absence of any law... is often the occasion and
cause for enactments, constitutional or legislative, general in their character, designed to cover
cases not merely of the same, but all cases of a similar, nature." County of Santa Clara v.
Southern Pac. R.L, 18 F. 385, 397-98 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883).
195. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
196. Id. at 2766.
197. 93 S.Ct. at 721.
198. 25 Iowa 128 (1868).
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be a dangerous act, generally producing one atd sometimes two deaths,-I mean the
death of the unborn infant and the death of the mother. Nov, the person who does
this is guilty of doing an unlawful act. If the death of the woman does not ensue
from it, he is liable to fine and imprisonment in the county jail ... and, if the death
of the woman does ensue from it, though there be no specific intention to take her
life, he becomes guilty of the crime of murder in the second degree. The guilt has its
origin in such cases in the unlawful act which the party designs to commit, and if
the loss of life attend it as incident or consequence, the crime and guilt of murder
will attach to the party committing such an unlawful act 10
In upholding the charge, the Iowa court stated: "We have quoted the
court's language in order to say that it has our approval as being a cor-
rect statement of the law of the land. 20 0 The court went on to say:
The common law is distinguished, and is to be commended, for its all-embracing and
salutary solicitude for the sacredness of human life and the personal safety of every
human being. This protecting, paternal care, enveloping every individual like the air
he breathes, not only extends to persons actually born, but, for some purposes, to
infants in ventre sa mere.
The right to life and to personal safety is not only sacred in the estimation of the
common law, but it is inalienable. It is no defense to the defendant that the abortion
was procured with the consent of the deceased.
The common law stands as a general guardian holding its aegis to protect the life
of all. Any theory which robs the law of this salutary power is not likely to meet
with favor. 201
Although the abortion in State v. Moore occurred after quickening, "no
mention is made of that fact in the opinion, ' 202 and the court was ob-
viously speaking of the "sacred" and "inalienable" right to life of all
unborn children.
In Wade, the Supreme Court created a new, unfettered right to de-
prive the unborn children of their lives. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,2 ' the
Court declared that "the very idea that one man may be compelled to
hold his life . . . at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in
any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery it-
self."20 4 So it is with Wade.
V. THE ERxoRS ON THE QUESTIONS OF HumAN LIFE AND
HuMAN-LEGAL PERSONHOOD
The Wade Court's historical errors were compounded by its equally
erroneous holdings on the questions of whether the unborn child is a
human being in fact and a human person in modern law.
199. Id. at 131-32 (emphasis added).
200. Id. at 132.
201. Id. at 135-36 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
202. State v. Harris, 90 Kan. 807, 813, 136 P. 264, 266 (1913).
203. 118 US. 356 (1886).
204. Id. at 370.
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A. The Failure To Resolve the Crucial Question of Fact
The framers intended that every live human being, every member of
the human race, even the most unwanted, come under the aegis of the
due process and equal protection clauses. History does not support
the proposition that the framers intended to exclude unborn children.
The Court in Wade observed that "[w]e need not resolve the difficult
question of when life begins. '20 5 But the Court erred at the threshold
when it failed to determine whether an individual life has already begun
before an abortion takes place. That was precisely the fact, of constitu-
tional dimension, to be resolved by the Court before it could even address
itself to the rights of unborn children.20 6
The Court noted, as justification for its refusal to resolve the crucial
factual issue, that "[w]hen those trained in the respective disciplines of
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus,
the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is
not in a position to speculate as to the answer.' 207 The Court then con-
cluded that "we do not agree that, by adopting one theory of life, Texas
may override the rights of the pregnant woman that are at stake." 8 But
what was at stake for the unborn child was not a "theory" of life; it was
the fact of life. The lack of consensus, to which the Court referred, is
not a lack of consensus on the fact of existence of human life at all stages
of gestation-that is established beyond cavil by medical science 200-but
on conflicting theories of the value of a human life already in existence.210
That value judgment was made over one hundred years ago, on a con-
stitutional level and as a matter of binding law, by the framers of the
fourteenth amendment. A "consensus" is not relevant. "One's right to
life.., depend[s] on the outcome of no elections."2 1n
As guardian ad litem for a class of unborn children, the writer com-
menced an action in New York in December, 1971 seeking, inter alia,
a declaration of the unconstitutionality of New York's abortion-at-will
law212 as a violation of the fourteenth amendment rights of unborn chil-
205. 93 S. Ct. at 730.
206. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
207. 93 S. Ct. at 730.
208. Id. at 731.
209. There is no scientific basis for establishing quickening, viability, birth or any event
other than conception as the beginning of human life. See Byrn, supra note 5, at 6-15.
210. See id. at 15-18. "I don't know of one biologist who would maintain that the fetus is
not alive .... Today we are employing euphemisms to pretend that human life is not present.
This stems from the fact that we are not quite ready yet to say, yes, there is human life but
it has no dignity .... There is a consensus on the starting point of life, without any question
." Andre Hellegers, M.D., quoted in The Catholic News, Mar. 15, 1973, at 1, col. 3.
211. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
212. Law of Apr. 11, 1970, ch. 127, [1970] N.Y. Laws 193d Sess. 852 (now N.Y. Penal
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dren. In support of a motion for an injunction pendente lite, affidavits
of a fetologist, a developmental biologist, a cytogeneticist and an ob-
stetrician-gynecologist were presented to the court.2 1
The testimony of these experts was striking indeed. Relying on it, the
trial court drew a composite picture of the typical victim of abortion:
Credence must, therefore, be given to the testimony, in affidavit form, submitted
by plaintiff from accredited scientists that an unborn human infant has a pulsating
human heart; that at that stage of development the child's brain, spinal cord and
entire nervous system has been established and that, as a medical fact, the fetus is a
live human being.214
The court then proceeded to grant the application for an injunction.
The appellate division admitted that there were "no factual issues
requiring a trial and the parties so conceded on the argument of the ap-
peal. The medical affidavits submitted by the guardian have not been
factually disputed and New York courts have already acknowledged
that, in the contemporary medical view, the child begins a separate life
from the moment of conception ..... 2'r However, the court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the unborn child is not a legal person.
A divided New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division,
but it too conceded that an unborn child "has an autonomy of develop-
ment and character although it is for the period of gestation dependent
upon the mother. It is human, if only because it may not be characterized
as not human, and it is unquestionably alive." 21 6
Needless to say, the writer disagreed with the legal conclusions of the
appellate division and the court of appeals. But their factual conclusions,
together with that of the trial court, are impeccable. These findings left
only two questions for the appeal to the United States Supreme Court:
1. Whether the individual members of appellant's unborn class, each of whom is a
"live human being," a "child [with] a separate life," a "human" who is "alive" and
"has an autonomy of development and character," are human persons entitled to
the protections afforded to such persons by the Constitution of the United States.
2. Whether New York's Elective Abortion Law, on its face, in its effect and as
Law § 125.05(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972)). The law puts no substantive restriction on abor-
tion through the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy. Id.
213. Respectively, Leverett Lebaron de Veber, M.D.; Donald J. Procaccini, Ph.D.; James
Garner, M.D., and Malcolm Hetzer, MD. The affidavits are reproduced at pages 100a-128a
of appellant's jurisdictional statement before the United States Supreme Court, filed Sept.
14, 1972 (No. 72-434) [hereinafter cited as Juris. State.].
214. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., Supreme Court of the State of New
York, Queens County, Index No. 13113/71, in Juris. State. 60a, 68a (unpublished opinion of
Francis J. Smith, J., Jan. 4, 1972).
215. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 App. Div. 2d 316, 324, 329
N.YS.2d 722, 729 (2d Dep't 1972) (citations omitted).
216. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 199, 286 N.E2d 887,
888, 335 N.YS.2d 390, 392 (197: , noted in 41 Fordham L. Rev. 439 (1972).
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applied, violates fundamental rights of the members of appellant's class, guaranteed
to them by the Constitution of the United States. 217
The Supreme Court did not address itself to these questions. Instead,
it dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question, citing
Wade,21s even though in Wade the Court had erred at the threshold by
declining to decide the crucial question of whether an abortion kills a live
human being.
Thus, paying no heed to the facts, the Supreme Court made its own
value judgment, one that is contrary to the intent of the framers of the
fourteenth amendment.
B. The Failure to Allude to the Court's Own Explication of
"Person" Under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
Before Wade, the Supreme Court's explication of human "person" in
section one of the fourteenth amendment had been consistent with the
intent of the framers. In Levy v. Louisiana,219 the Court identified the
human persons protected by the equal protection clause as those who
"are humans, live, and have their being. 220
Of course, it might well be argued that Levy concerned the rights of
afterborn illegitimate children and is inapposite to the unborn. The argu-
ment is specious unless courts and legislatures are free to draw fourteenth
amendment life-or-death lines on self-serving fictions, utterly irrational
by modern, secular, scientific standards. But that is precisely what they
are not free to do. "To say that the test of equal protection should be the
'legal' rather than the biological relationship is to avoid the issue. For
the Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State
to draw such 'legal' lines as it chooses." ''
Had the Levy standard been applied in Wade, the Court could not
have avoided passing on the factual, "biological" question of whether
unborn children are live human beings. Since, as a scientific fact, all of
217. This is substantially the form in which appellant presented the questions to the
Supreme Court. Juris. State. 4.
218. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 93 S. Ct. 1414 (1973).
219. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
220. Id. at 70 (footnote omitted); accord, 2 B. Schwartz, The Rights of Persons (1968):
"And the language of the amendment plainly states that the guaranty of equality contained
in it is to apply 'to any person.' Unless words are to be deprived of their ordinary meaning,
this must include every natural human being within the jurisdiction of any state ... 
Id. at 492.
221. Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968); accord, B. Schwartz,
The Supreme Court 265 (1957). The use of objective science in a constitutional context is far
from unprecedented. The findings of modem psychology were used to update the law In
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
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them are, the Court would have been required to take the next step and
find all unborn children to be human persons within section one of the
fourteenth amendment. Instead, the Court omitted Levy completely. In-
deed, having decided not to pass on the crucial question of fact, it had no
choice but to ignore Levy.
C. The Misunderstanding of the General Status in Law
of Unborn Children
In Wade, the Court stated: "In areas other than criminal abortion the
law has been reluctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it,
begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in
narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent
upon live birth."'  In support of this statement, the Court briefly touched
upon tort actions for prenatal injuries and for a stillbirth (wrongful
death), as well as the property rights of the unborn child. The Court
erred.
The unequivocal status of the unborn child as a legal person in these
areas of the law has been analyzed at length,' and there is no need to
reexamine it here.2" The more startling error was the Court's failure even
to advert to another area of prenatal law.
222. 93 S. Ct. at 731.
223. See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies,
46 Notre Dame Law. 349, 351-60 (1971).
224. Two parenthetical observations must be made. First, when the Court in Wade ob-
served that "the traditional rule of tort law had denied recovery for prenatal injuries even
though the child was born alive" (93 S. Ct. at 731 (footnote omitted)), it was speaking not
of a tradition but of a relatively short-lived aberration. The common law regarded the unborn
child as a human being in esse in all areas of the law except for the criminal law where the
exigencies of proof gave rise to the quickening dichotomy. Hall v. Hancock, 32 Ma-. (15
Pick) 255 (1834). The prenatal injury rule was first promulgated in 1884 in Dietrich v.
Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884). The rule has been roundly criticized for
its misunderstanding of law and science in a scholarly study in 1935. Law Revision Com-
mission, Communication to the Legislature relating to Prenatal Injuries 449, 453-54, 472-73
(1935). It was discredited in 1946, Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), and it is
now in all but complete disrepute. See Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and
Logical Inconsistencies, 46 Notre Dame Law. 349 (1971). In referring to the rule in some
states which permits a wrongful death action for a stillbirth, the Court in Wade stated that
"[sluch an action, however, would appear to be one to vindicate the parents' interest and is
thus consistent with the view that the fetus, at most, represents only the potentiality of life."
93 S. Ct. at 731. The statutory wrongful death action is always intended to vindicate the
interests of survivors. W. Prosser, Torts 902, 903-05 (4th ed. 1971). Thus, in New York, a
wrongful death action for a stillbirth is denied because the law does not consider the unborn
child to have a separate juridical existence "'except in so far as is necessary to protect the
child's own rights." Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 485, 248 NE.2d 901, 904, 301
N.Y.S.2d 65, 70 (1969) (citation omitted).
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The recognition of the unborn child as a live human being, a legal per-
son with fundamental human-legal rights-including the right to live and
to the law's protection-is explicit in the body of law extending parens
patriae protection to unborn children, regardless of gestational age.
At least from the time of Bracton, the King, as sovereign, was charged
with a special obligation to care for those who were not able to care for
themselves, particularly infants.2 In its modern application, the parens
patriae doctrine vests in the state, as sovereign, both the right and duty
to protect a child from harm, even at the hands of his parents. The sover-
eign has many obligations to the child. "Chief among them is the duty to
protect his right to live .... Y)22O
Thus, parents do not have a right of complete dominion over their chil-
dren. Most certainly, a parent does not have a right to elect whether his
or her child shall live or die. As the court observed in In re Clark:
No longer can parents virtually exercise the power of life or death over their
children. No longer can they put their child of tender years out to work and collect
his earnings. They may not abuse their child or contribute to his dependency, neglect,
or delinquency. Nor may they abandon him, deny him proper parental care, neglect
or refuse to provide him with proper or necessary subsistence, education, medical or
surgical care, or other care necessary for his health, morals, or well-being; or neglect
or refuse to provide the special care made necessary by his mental condition; or permit
him to visit disreputable places or places prohibited by law, or associate with vagrant,
vicious, criminal, notorious, or immoral persons; or permit him to engage in an occu-
pation prohibited by law or one dangerous to life or limb or injurious to his health
or morals .... And while they may, under certain circumstances, deprive him of his
liberty or his property, under no circumstances, with or without due process, with or
without religious sanction, may they deprive him of his life 1227
It is true, of course, that Clark involved a post-natal child. Still, two
propositions must, by common sense and common law, also be acknowl-
edged as true: (a) the parens patriae doctrine protects human children
precisely because they are legal persons with fundamental human-legal
rights (particularly the rights to live and to the law's protection) which
they are unable effectively to assert themselves because of their youth and
utter dependence on others; (b) if the doctrine has been extended to un-
born children, it can only mean that they too are legal persons (with the
same fundamental human-legal rights) whose youth and utter dependence
impose upon the state the duty to protect their respective rights to live.
In fact, the parens patriae doctrine has been extended to unborn chil-
dren, without regard to their gestational ages, and even at the expense of
225. See Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 24 Eng. Rep. 659, 666 (Ch. 1722).
226. See In re Clark, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 86, 89, 185 N.E.2d 128, 132 (C.P. 1962).
227. Id. at 89, 185 N.E.2d at 131 (citation omitted).
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such highly valued rights as personal (bodily) privacy, family privacy
and religious freedom. m8
In Hoener v. Bertinato,2 9 a New Jersey court was asked to appoint a
guardian for a child in utero, immediately prior to birth, in order that the
guardian might consent to a transfusion at birth. The child's parents had
refused their consent for religious reasons. In appointing the guardian, the
court stated: (1) "'This parens patriae jurisdiction is a right of sover-
eignty and imposes a duty on the sovereignty to protect the public interest
and to protect such persons with disabilities who have no rightful pro-
tector;' ,,130 (2) "Additionally, it is now settled that an unborn child's
right to life and health is entitled to legal protection even if it is not
viable; " 31 and (3) "I conclude, therefore, that the [guardianship] statute
is applicable to the instant case even though the child is not yet born." '
An attempt might be made to distinguish Hoener on the grounds that
the guardianship appointment was made while the unborn child was
viable, and the transfusion was to be administered after birth. Conse-
quently, it might be argued that the case applied only to born children
and not to the unborn (except, possibly, if they are viable). But the plain
language of the decision is to the contrary. The court applied, to a partic-
ular unborn child, who happened to be viable, the general rule that the
sovereign has a parens patriae duty to protect all unborn children against
the conduct of those who threaten their right to live.
Raleiglz Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital v. Anderson'-" is a
natural corollary to Hoener. This case arose out of a dispute over pro-
posed blood transfusions for a pregnant woman, while the child was still
in the womb. The plaintiff-hospital sought an order to administer the
transfusions in the event that they would be necessary to save the life of
the woman and the life of her unborn child. Such medical treatment was
contrary to the religious beliefs of the woman and her husband. The court
nevertheless ordered the transfusions. In its ruling, the court stated:
In State v. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), we held that the State's
concern for the welfare of an infant justified blood transfusions notwithstanding the
228. See Estate of Warner, No. 71 P 3681 (Cir. CL, Cook County, 11L, May 5, 1971);
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mern. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 NJ. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 989 (1964); Hoener v. Bertinato, 67 N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv.
& Dom. ReL Ct. 1961).
229. 67 N.J. Super. S17, 171 A.2d 140 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1961).
230. Id. at 522, 171 A.2d at 142 (emphasis omitted), quoting Johnson v. State, 18 NJ. 422
430, 114 A.2d 1, 5 (1955).
231. 67 N.J. Super. at 524, 171 A.2d at 144 (citation omitted).
232. Id. at 525, 171 A.2d at 145.
233. 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
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objection of its parents who were also Jehovah's Witnesses, and in Smith v. Brennan,
31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960), we held that a child could sue for injuries negli-
gently inflicted upon it prior to birth. We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled
to the law's protection and that an appropriate order should be made to insure blood
transfusions to the mother in the event that they are necessary in the opinion of the
physician in charge at the time.23
State v. Perricone involved protection of an after-born infant. Smith v.
Brennan involved an injury to a pre-viable infant. Raleigh Fitkin itself
involved a viable infant. Quite clearly, the Raleigh Fitkin court consid-
ered after-born, viable and pre-viable infants to be entitled, without dis-
tinction, to the law's protection. In allowing a cause of action for injuries
sustained in utero by an infant while pre-viable, the Smith court had held
that "the law recognizes that rights which he will enjoy when born can
be violated before his birth."2"5 It was precisely to prevent such violations
of basic rights that the guardians were appointed in Iloener and Raleigh
Fitkin. In neither instance was "quickening," "viability," or birth rele-
vant. Life was the vital element.
Estate of Warner28 leaves no doubt that parens patriae protection ex-
tends to all unborn children. In Warner, an Illinois court appointed a con-
servator of the "persons" of a pregnant woman and her unborn child on
a doctor's petition showing that "the life of the unborn child ...is in
danger because the mother requires immediate blood transfusions in order
to save the life of the unborn child, ' 2 7 and further, that "[t]he unborn
child is incapable of making any intelligent decision. ' 2 8 The operative
part of the order stated: "It is further ordered that the Conservator ad-
minister or cause to be administered blood transfusions . . . in order to
save the life of the unborn child of Katherine Warner." 2 0
It is to be noted that the child was not viable when the transfusion was
ordered:
A spokesman for Mount Sinai Hospital said the woman . . . remained in critical
condition after receiving almost four pints of blood.
However, doctors said an examination showed the 4-month old fetus was alive "with
a strong heartbeat."240
234. 42 N.J. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538 (emphasis added).
235. 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 502 (1960).
236. No. 71 P 3681 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill., May 5, 1971).
237. Id., Petition For Conservator.
238. Id., Physicians Affidavit-Conservatorship.
239. Id., Order of Adjudication of Incompetency and Appointing Conservator (emphasis
added).
240. Chicago Sun-Times, May 6, 1971, at 12, col. 1 (emphasis added).
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Like most cases involving emergency blood transfusions, the decision was
rendered by a lower court and is unreported. Nevertheless, it remains per-
suasive as an inevitable application of Hoener and Raleigh Fitkin to a
pre-viable child.
An attempt might be made to distinguish Raleigh Fitkin and Warner
on the ground that the mothers' lives were in danger in both instances,
and the transfusion orders were made solely for the women. Such an
argument lacks any color of validity. In Warner, the "Petition For Con-
servator," the "Physician's Affidavit," and the "Order of Adjudication Of
Incompetency and Appointing Conservator" are all framed in terms of
saving the unborn child's life, with no reference to saving the life of the
mother. Moreover, in It re Estate of Brooks,'24 1 the Illinois Supreme
Court had ruled that a compulsory transfusion of an unwilling adult
against her religious beliefs would violate the adult's first amendment
rights. In Brooks, the adult was not pregnant. In Warner, the unborn
child's right to live took precedence over any other right.
In Raleigh Fithin, the court specifically refused to decide "the more
difficult question" whether a compulsory transfusion for the pregnant
woman to save her own life would be mandated, since it had already
determined that the child had a right to the law's protection. -42 Thus,
Raleigh Fitkin must have been based upon the unborn child's right to
live. There was, then, no authority for a compulsory transfusion to an
unwilling nonpregnant adult nor did Raleigh Fitkin decide that issue.
Hoener, Raleigh Fitkin and Warner may be viewed in three different
ways, all leading to the same conclusion. First, "only those interests of
the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." 48 The unborn child's
right to life is one of those interests. At the time and under the circum-
stances of Raleigh Fitkin and Warner, only the right to life of a live hu-
man being, the unborn child as a legal person, could have prevailed over
the pregnant woman's right of free religious exercise.
Second, "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded,
by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."2 4 The clear
241. 32 f1. 2d 361, 20 N.E.2d 43. (1965).
242. 42 N.J. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538. That issue remained undedded in New Jersey until
J'ohn F. Kennedy Mem. Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971), noted in 41
Fordham L. Rev. 158 (1972).
243. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 US. 205, 215 (1972).
244. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 US. 250, 291 (1891).
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and unquestionable authority of law in Raleigh Fitkin and Warner can be
found only in the parens patriae doctrine, which, in turn, extends only to
legal persons who have fundamental rights to live and to the law's pro-
tection. The application of the parens patriae doctrine to unborn children
necessarily means that every unborn child, regardless of his gestational
age, is a legal person with a fundamental right to live, which the state
has a basic obligation to protect.
Third, "[p]roperty does not have rights. People have rights." 24 Un-
born children have rights and are, therefore, valuable people, not dispos-
able property. A principal guarantee of the rights of people in today's
society is section one of the fourteenth amendment. Of necessity, every
unborn child is a legal person within that section.
The Court's error in attempting to determine the unborn child's status
in law without adverting to the blood transfusion cases is obvious. In this
same vein, the Court committed another error when it apparently relied
on the concession by appellee in Wade "that no case could be cited that
holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 246 There are two relevant observations to be made about this
statement. In the first instance it may be said that the inability of appellee
in Wade to cite a case does not mean that the case does not exist. In
Steinberg v. Brown,2 47 a federal district court stated: "Once human life
has commenced, the constitutional protections found in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments impose upon the state the duty of safeguarding
it."2" Furthermore, the Wade Court might have taken note of those cases
which, in the abortion context and in obvious paraphrase of the Declara-
tion of Independence, characterize the lives of unborn children of all
gestational ages as "sacred" and "inalienable."' ' 9 The Constitution in-
corporates the basic guarantees of the Declaration.250 Unless we are to
assume that the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended to strip
245. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972), noted in 41 Fordham L.
Rev. 431 (1972).
246. 93 S. Ct. at 728-29.
247. 321 F. Supp. 741 (NfD. Ohio 1970). Steinberg arose out of a challenge to the Ohio
abortion statutes on grounds similar to those in Wade and Bolton. As indicated at the outset
of this article, a discussion of these cases has been avoided. See note 10 supra. Steinberg is
mentioned here only in the context of the Court's statement.
248. 321 F. Supp. at 746-47. It might be argued that this statement is dictum, not holding,
but that hardly seems relevant in the context of the Court's observation.
249. See State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 135-36 (1868); People v. Sessions, 58 Mich. 594,
596, 26 N.W. 291, 293 (1886); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 30, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967).
250. Gulf, Colo. & S. Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 160 (1897); Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893).
[Vol. 41
THE SUPREME COURT ON ABORTION
live human beings of their sacred and inalienable right to live, these cases
must be interpreted as indicating an opinion that unborn children are
persons under section one of the fourteenth amendment. Finally, the blood
transfusion cases discussed above251 must be taken as decisions of four-
teenth amendment significance.
Secondly, the absence of any such decision should not be influential. As
was noted in still another life-or-death context, "[t] he constitutionality of
death itself under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is before
this Court for the first time; we cannot avoid the question by recalling
past cases that never directly considered it.12 2
It is evident that the Court's errors in Wade are cumulative. From a
distorted interpretation of the common law of abortion to a general mis-
understanding of the status of the unborn in American law, the Court
erected a flimsy house of cards, piling one error upon another.
D. The Presumption Against Human Life and Legal Personhood
Part of the reason for the Court's errors in Wade was its approach. By
structuring the opinion to create at the outset a right of privacy which
includes the right to abort, the Court shifted the burden to the State of
Texas to prove that unborn children are legal persons, whereas the pre-
sumption should have been in the children's favor. Moreover, the Court
guaranteed the irrebutability of the presumption by refusing to decide
whether the victim of an abortion is a live human being. Having created
an insurmountable barrier, the Court proceeded to decide the fourteenth
amendment personhood of unborn children in a case where they were un-
represented by a guardian and wherein no comprehesive record of expert
testimony on the issue of their live humanbeingness had been devel-
oped in the trial court.
251. See text accompanying notes 229-45 supra.
252. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 285 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). However,
the Court in Wade did just that when it claimed that it had "inferentially" held in United
States v. Vuitch, 402 US. 62 (1971), that unborn children are not fourteenth amendment
persons. 93 S. Ct. at 729. In Vuitch, the Court held that the District of Columbia abortion
statute (which permits abortion only to preserve the life or health of the mother) is not
unconstitutionally vague, particularly noting that "vagueness . . . is the only issue we reach
here." 402 U.S. at 73 (citations omitted). Life and death issues are not decided sub silentio.
"[I]legitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely, by
silent approaches . . . ." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886). One might as well
say the whole abortion issue was decided against the Wade and Bolton plaintiffs in Missouri
ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926), wherein the Court unanimously upheld a state
statute authorizing revocation of a physician's license for unlawfully performing an abortion.
Of course, the constitutional issues raised by the physician were different, but on the "inferen-




The better view of the common law, the known motivation behind
nineteenth century abortion legislation, the intent of the framers, the
factual humanbeingness of unborn children, the Supreme Court's own
prior explication of "person" in section one of the fourteenth amendment,
and the general status in law of unborn children point inexorably to a con-
clusion that the children are within the scope of the due process and equal
protection clauses. But assuming arguendo that a substantial doubt still
exists, unborn children are not, by virtue of that doubt, automatically ex-
cluded from the fourteenth amendment. For a number of reasons, the
benefit of doubt must rest with the children, and the burden of proof with
those who urge exclusion.
"[C]onstitutional provisions for the security of person and property
should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives
them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right,
as if it consisted more in sound than in substance.""' The rule of liberal
construction of constitutional rights was not meant to be thwarted by a
rule of illiberal selectivity in the designation of the "person" entitled to
assert those rights. Every live human being is included--unless a specific
intent to exclude particular individuals or classes can be shown.
The rule of liberal construction places the benefit of the doubt on the
side of him whose life or liberty is threatened under color of law by the
state or its instrumentalities. If, as we are told by the Supreme Court in
In re Winship,25 4 the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt in criminal cases is among "'the fundamental principles that are
deemed essential for the protection of life and liberty,' ,,25r then how much
more endangered are the rights to life and liberty when a live human
being, threatened with death, has the burden of overcoming a presump-
tion that he is legally not a person, but property, disposable at the will of
his "owner" aided and abetted by governmentl If "[i]t is critical that
the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned,"250
then how much more critical is it to the continued vitality of constitutional
rights that they not be circumvented by a presumption of nonpersonhood
raised against the innocent human beings who lay claim to them!
Just as "fundamental fairness 25 7 requires the state to prove guilt
253. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 635.
254. 397 U.S. 358 (1970), noted in 39 Fordham L. Rev. 121 (1970).
255. 397 U.S. at 362, quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895).
256. 397 U.S. at 364.
257. Id. at 363.
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beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case "'to safeguard men from
dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life' ," so
too do both fundamental fairness and an abhorrence of the forfeiture of
life require that every live human being be accounted a fourteenth amend-
ment person-unless a specific intent to exclude particular individuals or
classes can be shown.
As heretofore noted, 59 the intent of the framers was to insure four-
teenth amendment personhood not only to blacks but to every member of
the human race. Slavery-the degradation in law and society of one class
of live human beings to the status of property-was the occasion for a
broad, remedial constitutional enactment designed to recognize the legal
personhood of all classes of live human beings. All history shows that a
particular grievance suffered by one class has led to remedial enactments
intended to protect every class from the same fate.2 -0 To require any
human being to hold his life at the will of others is intolerable as being of
the very essence of slavery.20' All live human beings are, by that fact
alone, also fourteenth amendment persons----unless a specific intent to
exclude particular individuals or classes can be shown.
It is submitted that had the Court in Wade placed the burden of proof
where it belonged--on those urging exclusion of unborn live human beings
from fourteenth amendment protection-the outcome, of necessity, would
have been different.
2. The Lack of Representation
By ordinary standards of fairness, the Wade opinion should not have
been considered by the Supreme Court to be decisive of the rights of un-
born children. 6 - They were not parties to the action, nor was there a
guardian before the Court representing their interests. It might be argued,
of course, that the State of Texas adequately represented the unborn
children,2"a but the argument must fail.
It is true that in Griswold v. Connecticut"4 the Court recognized the
standing of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and a physi-
cian to raise the constitutional rights of married people with whom they
had a professional relationship. However, Griswold involved a defense to
258. Id. at 362, quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949).
259. See Part IV (C) supra.
260. County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pac. P.P., 18 F. 385, 397-98 (C.C.). Cal. 1883).
261. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
262. But it was. See Bym v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 93 S. Ct. 1414 (1973).
263. In Wade, the defandant raised the fourteenth amendment personhood of the unborn
child as a compelling state interest. 93 S. Ct. at 725.
264. 381 US. 479 (1965).
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a criminal prosecution, and the Supreme Court noted that if declaratory
relief had been sought, "the requirements of standing should be strict,
lest the standards of 'case or controversy' in Article III of the Constitution
become blurred."20 It seems clear that a decision in Griswold, adverse to
the constitutional rights of married people (who were not parties), would
not have bound them in any pending or subsequent action.206 Moreover,
it cannot be said that the Texas Attorney General stood in substantially
the same position as the class of unborn children whose rights he pur-
ported to assert. Clearly, he was not a member of the class and could
not adequately represent its members. 0 ' As a public official, his interest
was ever subject to the vagaries of legislative action and potentially in
conflict with the interests of the unborn child.2 08 A party possessing such
potentially conflicting interests cannot represent the rights of an absent
party or fairly insure their protection.2 0' As the Supreme Court has said:
Some litigants-those who never appeared in a prior action-may not be col-
laterally estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had a chance to
present their evidence and arguments on the claim. Due process prohibits estopping
them despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand
squarely against their position.270
Not only did the Court raise a presumption against the rights of unborn
children, but, in addition, it denied them a hearing.
VI. THE ERRORS IN INTERPRETATION OF CRITERIA PURPORTEDLY
NEGATIVING THE PERSONHOOD OF UNBORN CHILDREN
In support of its conclusion that unborn children are not persons under
section one of the fourteenth amendment and to bulwark the presump-
tion it had raised against them, the Court in Wade resorted to a number
of criteria of legal personhood which unborn children purportedly do
not meet. None of these criteria supports the Court's conclusion.
A. The Census Criterion
The Court observed, "[w]e are not aware that in the taking of any
census . . . a fetus has ever been counted."' 7' The writer is not aware
265. Id. at 481.
266. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
267. Id. at 41, 43.
268. Compare Hall v. Lefkowitz, 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (New York Attorney
General defending a restrictive abortion statute) with Byrn v. New York City Health &
Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972) (New York Attorney
General defending an abortion-at-will statute).
269. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940).
270. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
271. 93 S. Ct. at 729 n.53.
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that in the taking of any census a corporation has ever been counted
either. Yet, a corporation is a legal person under the equal protection
clause.272 Obviously, the enumeration clause -73 is not exhaustive of the
persons protected by section one of the fourteenth amendment. Indeed,
it is too late in the evolution of human rights to label a whole class of
live human beings as non-persons, while at the same time extending the
equal protection of the laws to corporations, including, ironically, those
which manufacture and use the abortional instruments that kill these
live human beings.
B. The Incrimination Criterion
The Court noted that no state forbids all abortions, and the Texas
statute, in particular, contained the "typical" exception from criminality
for an abortion necessary to save the life of the mother.274 The Court
then asked rhetorically: "But if the fetus is a person who is not to be
deprived of life without due process of law, and if the mother's condition
is the sole determinant, does not the Texas exception appear to be out of
line with the Amendment's command?"'275
No, it does not. The maternal lifesaving exception to criminal abortion
is justifiable under the doctrine of "legal necessity" which also applies
to postnatal human beings: "(1) the harm, to be justified, must have
been committed under pressure of physical forces; (2) it must have
made possible the preservation of at least an equal value; and (3) the
commission of the harm must have been the only means of conserving that
value. '2 76 The doctrine is of ancient origin and is usually cast in terms
of two survivors of a shipwreck clinging to a piece of flotsam which will
support only one of them. 7 Although the status of the doctrine in
American law has been somewhat ambiguous, -78 the modern view is that
legal necessity applies, at least in some cases, to homicide. -10 In the con-
text of Wade, two features of the doctrine should be emphasized: first,
272. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
273. US. Const. art. I, § 2, c. 3.
274. 93 S. Ct. at 729 n.54.
275. Id.
276. J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 426 (2d ed. 1960) (footnote omitted).
277. See J. Stephen, A Digest of the Criminal Law 19 (1877).
278. Compare United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (No. 15,383) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842)
with Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69, 73 (1853) (dictum). "[T]he same great principle . ..
justifies the exclusive appropriation of a plank in a shipwreck, though the life of another be
sacrificed .. . ." American Print Works v. Lawrence, 21 N.J.L. 248, 257-58 (Sup. Ct. 1847)
(dictum).
279. See Model Penal Code § 3.02, at 5-10 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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in its application to abortion, via the maternal lifesaving exception to
criminality, the doctrine was designed for the preservation of life, and
typically the choice was between the loss of two lives (mother and child)
or the preservation of one (the mother); second, the doctrine is ap-
plicable to both prenatal and postnatal human beings. If the availability
of legal necessity as a defense to a homicide of a postnatal human being
does not turn all such human beings into fourteenth amendment non-
persons, then the application of the doctrine to prenatal human beings,
in the form of a maternal lifesaving exception to criminal abortion, can-
not be relevant to the determination of whether these live human beings
are persons under section one of the fourteenth amendment.
The issue is not whether the Supreme Court agrees with the doctrine
of necessity as applied to abortion cases, 280 but whether such application
is evidence of the nonpersonhood of unborn children. Clearly it is not.
C. The Accessoryship Criterion
The Court pointed out that "in Texas the woman is not a principal or
an accomplice with respect to an abortion upon her. If the fetus is a
person, why is the woman not a principal or an accomplice?1 281 The
reasons appear to be historical and pragmatic and completely irrelevant
to the unborn child's legal personhood. Historically, abortion was viewed
as an assault upon the woman because she "was not deemed able to assent
to an unlawful act against herself .... ,212 As a result, the woman was
considered a victim rather than a perpetrator of, or an accomplice in,
the abortion.283 Pragmatically, conviction of the abortionist frequently
280. Apparently it does. Earlier in Wade, the Court had cited with apparent approval,
The King v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B. 687, a controversial decision applying the necessity doc-
trine to abortion. 93 S. Ct. at 719. See Davies, The Law of Abortion and Necessity, 2 Modem
L. Rev. 126 (1938). While the writer has elsewhere expressed his disagreement with the
scope of the Bourne decision-applying the necessity doctrine to maternal health as well as
life (Report of the Governor's Commission Appointed to Review New York State's Abortion
Law, Minority Report 47, 68-69 (1968))-that is not the point here. The point is: how could
the Supreme Court be aware of the application of the necessity doctrine to abortion In Bourne
and still use the Texas maternal lifesaving exception as evidence of the nonpersonhood of un-
born children without even discussing the doctrine?
281. 93 S. Ct. at 729 n.94.
282. State v. Farnam, 82 Ore. 211, 217, 161 P. 417, 419 (1916).
283. "[The woman] did not stand legally in the situation of an accomplice; for although
she, no doubt, participated in the moral offence imputed to the defendant, she could not have
been indicted for that offence; the law regards her rather as the victim than the perpetrator
of the crime." Dunn v. People, 29 N.Y. 523, 527 (1864) (citations omitted); see Annot., 66
Am. Dec. 82, 87 (1911). There is, however, some authority that "the mother may be guilty
of the murder of a child in ventre sa mere, if she takes poison with an intent to poison it,
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depended upon the testimony of the aborted woman (especially if a
subjective element like quickening were at issue). The woman could
hardly be expected to testify if her testimony automatically incriminated
her.se The omission to incriminate the woman is no more than a statutory
grant of immunity. It has no bearing on the personhood of the child.
D. The Penalty Criterion
The Court asserted that the penalty for criminal abortion in Texas
is significantly less than the maximum penalty for murder. "If the fetus
is a person, may the penalties be different?"28
The penalties may be and are different. The law recognizes "degrees
of evil" and states may treat offenders accordingly. - 0 Killing an unborn
child may, in legislative judgment, involve less personal malice than
killing a child after birth even though the result is the same-just as, for
instance, a legislature may choose to categorize, as something less than
murder, intentional killing under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance287 or intentionally aiding and abetting a suicide.Ms Such legisla-
tive recognitions of degrees of malice in killing have nothing to do with
the fourteenth amendment personhood of the victims.
E. The Citizenship Criterion
In support of its holding that unborn children are not fourteenth
amendment persons, the Court cited289 Montana v. Rogers.2 90 It is true
that Rogers held that a person conceived in the United States but born
elsewhere is not a citizen by birth under the citizenship clause of the
fourteenth amendment,29 but it is equally true that the term "persons"
and "citizens" in the citizenship clause are not co-extensive. The clause
does not relegate non-citizens to nonpersonhood. An alien is not "natural-
ized" but he is protected as a person by the due process and equal pro-
and the child is born alive, and afterwards dies of that poison." Beale v. Beale, 24 Eng. Rep.
373 (Ch. 1713) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted) (dictum).
284. People v. Nixon, 42 Mich. App. 332, 343, 201 N.W.2d 63S, 646 (1972) (concurring
and dissenting opinion).
285. 93 S. CL at 729 n-54.
286. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540 (1942).
287. E.g., N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.20(2), 125.25(1a) (lkcKinney 1967).
288. Id. §§ 125.15(3), 125.25(lb).
289. 93 S. Ct. at 729.
290. 278 F.2d 68, 72 (7th Cir. 1960), aff'd sub nom. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 US. 303
(1961).
291. "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." US. Const.
amend. XIV, § i.
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tection clauses.20 2 A corporation is not "born", but it is protected as a
person by the equal protection clause.2 3 The fact that an unborn child
is not a citizen has no bearing on his personhood under section one of
the fourteenth amendment.
F. The Homicide Criterion
Keeler v. Superior Court 4 and State v. Dickinson20 were cited by
the Court"' as being in accord with its finding that unborn children are
not fourteenth amendment persons. It is true that in these cases it was
held that an unborn child, killed as a result of a crime committed upon
the mother, is not a "person" within the relevant murder (Keeler) and
vehicular homicide (Dickinson) statutes of the respective states. But
the decisions do not pertain to the unborn's status under the fourteenth
amendment.
First, an assault or a reckless driving statute, which protects a preg-
nant woman against wrongful injury, of necessity also protects the unborn
child she carries within her. If an individual kills the baby by a deliberate
assault upon the mother or by reckless driving causing harm to her, he
has already committed a separate crime. The child is protected by the
same law which protects the mother. On the other hand, the abortion
situation is sui generis in that the child requires separate protection.
Keeler and Dickinson do not deprive the child of the law's protection and
cannot be said to deny his fourteenth amendment personhood.
Second, both Keeler and Dickinson correctly held that the homicide
statutes under which the defendants were charged must be interpreted
according to common law definitions of homicide (or else the statutes
would be subject to an ex post facto objection). As pointed out earlier in
this article,"' problems of proof at common law prevented a prosecution
for homicide for aborting an unborn child unless the child was born alive
and then died. Statutes incorporating common law concepts of homicide
must, therefore, be interpreted to exclude the unborn child.
Third, abortion statutes are the proper vehicle for protecting unborn
children; such was the intent of the legislatures that enacted them. 2 8
292. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
293. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
294. 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
295. 28 Ohio St. 2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971).
296. 93 S. Ct. at 729.
297. See Part IV (A) supra.
298. See Part IV (B) supra. That the crime is labelled abortion instead of homicide, and the
victim is called an unborn child or fetus or embryo instead of a person are not factors
affecting the personhood of the unborn child under section one of the fourteenth amendment.
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Keeler and Dickinson, like all of the criteria cited by the Wade Court
do not support a finding that the unborn child is a fourteenth amendment
nonperson.
The veneer of scholarship in the Wade opinion is only that and nothing
more. Beneath the surface, there is little that is not error.
VII. THE DANGEROUS IMPLICATIONS IN Wade
Almost three years ago, the writer published an article warning of the
dangerous implications of the jurisprudence of permissive abortion. 3 The
article pointed out that one of the predominant characteristics of the
abortion philosophy is the substitution of the quality of life for the
sanctity of life; so that, under the influence of advanced technological
know-how, the right to life is reserved only for those whose lives are use-
ful, with the result that euthanasia fits as naturally into the jurisprudence
of permissive abortion as does abortion itself.300 It was also pointed out
that there inhered in the quality-of-life jurisprudence the danger of com-
pulsory abortion because any alleged right of privacy to choose whether
or not to abort would be subordinated to the interests of society in main-
tamining a certain quality of life.3 '
Both compulsory abortion and involuntary euthanasia surfaced in
Wade.
A. Compulsory Abortion
It must be remembered that the Court in Wade rejected any absolute
right of a woman to choose whether or not to abort, and premised its
holding on a limited right of privacy, subordinate to compelling state
interests.3 2 As one example of an appropriate state limitation on the
'How simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if specific
problems could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on them I" Trop v. Dulles, 356
US. 86, 94 (1958). "A fertile source of perversion in constitutional theory is the tyranny of
labels." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934). The futility of relying on labels is
evident in the New York Penal Law. A "'person,' when referring to the victim of a homicide,
means a human being who has been born and is alive." N.Y. Penal Law § 125.05(1)
(McKinney 1967). Yet, "[homicide means conduct which causes the death of ... an unborn
child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four weTeks under
circumstances constituting ... abortion in the first degree or self-abortion in the first degree."
N.Y. Penal Law § 125.00 (McKinney 1967). Thus, an unborn child who is not a "person"
may nevertheless be the victim of a "homicide."
299. Byrn, supra note S.
300. Id. at 24-28.
301. Id. at 28-31.
302. 93 S. Ct. at 726-27.
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right of privacy, the Court cited 03 Buck v. Bell804 which upheld the
validity of a state statute providing for compulsory sterilization of mental
defectives whose affliction is hereditary. The state "interest" in that
situation was, of course, in preventing the proliferation of defectives.
It had been thought that Buck v. Bell died after the Nazi experience,"'
and its revival now is rather frightening. By implication in Wade, the
Court espoused the constitutional validity of state-imposed, compulsory
abortion of unborn children diagnosed intrautero as mentally defective."0
Neither the child's constitutional rights (of which the Court could find
none) nor the mother's right of privacy (which the Court, by citing Buck,
found limited by the state's "interest" in preventing the birth of mental
defectives) could, according to the theory of Wade, be interposed to
challenge such a statute.
The spectre of compulsory abortion assumes additional substance when
one reads in a concurring opinion °7 (within a page to a citation to Buck
v. Bell) that certain situations of pregnancy make abortion "the only
civilized step to take," and "[t]he 'liberty' of the mother, though rooted
as it is in the Constitution, may be qualified by the State for the reasons
we have stated."' 08 Presumably, the state has a sufficient interest to
mandate the "civilized step" of abortion in certain situations.
The social engineering overtones of the Wade opinion do nothing to
quiet the fear of compulsory abortion. In the very beginning of its opinion,
the Court asserted that "population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial
overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem." 00 At the
end of the opinion, the Court concluded that its decision is consistent "with
the demands of the profound problems of the present day."8 1° Evidently,
the Court, as social engineer, views abortion as a viable solution to such
quality-of-life problems as pollution, poverty, population growth and race.
If the state's interest in the solution of these problems can be said to be
sufficiently compelling to overcome the right of individual privacy, then
compulsory abortion might conceivably encompass others besides the
mentally defective unborn child.
303. Id. at 727.
304. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
305. See C. Rice, The Vanishing Right to Live 143-44 (1969).
306. The procedure for such diagnosis is called amniocentesis. R. Rugh & L.B. Shettles,
From Conception to Birth 201 (1971). Dr. Y. Edward Hsia of Yale has suggested that amnio-
centesis might be made compulsory to determine whether or not a child has defects and If so
abortion might also be made compulsory. Voice For Life News-Notes, Mar. 1973, at 5.
307. 93 S. Ct. at 756 (Douglas, J., concurring).
308. Id. at 760.
309. Id. at 708-09.
310. Id. at 733.
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All this disquietude is compounded by the Court's apparent adoption of
what the writer has called "techno-morality."31 Because advanced technol-
ogy now knows how to do something, it becomes the right thing to do and
facts and law must be readjusted accordingly. Thus, in Wade, the Court
rejected the view that life begins at conception because of, inter alia,
"new medical techniques such as menstrual extraction. ' 312 In other
words, the availability of a new technique for performing early abortions
justifies a facile redefinition of the facts and law of what an abortion kills
so that the technique may be used. What is really being redefined, of
course, is the value of the human life destroyed by the abortion. Com-
menting on the Court's decision, a leading prenatal scientist observed:
"[W]e're dealing with human beings; we're dealing with human life....
They have used terms like 'potential life,' trying to say that life wasn't
there, when the reason for saying that life wasn't there was because they
didn't attach any value to it. 313
To find a basis for compulsory abortion in Wade requires no distortion
of the Court's opinion. Buck v. Bell, judicial social engineering, and
techno-morality all combine to make it a very real and very frightening
prospect.
B. Involuntary Euthanasia
Also very real and very frightening is the prospect of involuntary
euthanasia. The Court in Wade refused to "resolve the difficult question
of when life begins [because] medicine, philosophy, and theology are un-
able to arrive at any consensus," 314 even though the Court expressed its
awareness of "the well-known facts of fetal development." 31 1 As previously
pointed out,316 the controversy to which the Court referred involves not
whether abortion kills a live human being, but whether that live human
being is worth keeping alive or, to put it another way, whether he may be
killed with impunity. The determination is not a factual one but a value
judgment on whether the life of a human being, distinguishable from other
human beings only by kind and degree of dependency, is meaningful. Thus
in Wade, the Court held: "With respect to the State's important and legiti-
mate interest in potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability. This is
311. Byrn, supra note 5, at 28.
312. 93 S. Ct. at 731. Menstrual extraction consists in suctioning out the lining of the
uterus. It is performed between the fifth and seventeenth day following a missed menstrual
period-before pregnancy is confirmed by a pregnancy test. Letter from William D. Walden,
M.D., to the Editor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1973, at 34, coL 5.
313. Andre Hellegers, M.D., quoted in The Catholic News, Mar. 15, 1973, at 1, col 3.
314. 93 S. Ct. at 730.
315. Id. at 728.
316. See Part V (A) supra and text accompanying note 313.
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so because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful
life outside the mother's womb. ' '8 7
The same kind of controversy might very well arise with respect to the
end of life. Because of illness, age or incapacity, a live human being, in-
distinguishable from other live human beings except by kind and degree
of dependency, might be claimed by some in the disciplines of medicine,
philosophy and theology to be no longer alive in a "meaningful" way.
Joseph Fletcher has argued:
Consistency may be the virtue of merely petty minds, but I want to point out that,
even though it might muddy the waters of debate, the fact is that determining whether
the quality of human life (as distinguished from mere vitality) is present arises at
both ends of the life spectrum, and therefore abortion and euthanasia are intertwined
questions of ethics. A physician in North Carolina recently asked me, 'Why is it
that society tell us we may terminate a life for some reasons in utero, but not in
terminus?' When is the humanum, humanness, here and when is it gone? In our
present state of knowledge I suspect this is an unanswerable question but that there-
fore we ought to be putting our heads together to see what criteria for being "human"
we can fairly well agree upon. It's worth a try. Medical initiative is at stake in both
abortion and euthanasia and the problem ethically is the same.818
More recently,819 Fletcher has detailed "criteria for being 'human,'"
including, among others, minimal intelligence, self-awareness, self-control,
a sense of time, a sense of futurity, a sense of the past, the capability to
relate to others, concern for others, communication, control of existence,
curiosity, change and changeability, balance of rationality and feeling, and
(as a negative criterion) that "man is not a bundle of rights. 8 20 In apply-
ing these criteria it must be remembered: "We reject the classical
sanctity-of-life ethics and embrace the quality-of-life ethics."'821
Given a carefully orchestrated controversy (such as that undertaken by
Fletcher) and the Court's unwillingness in Wade to recognize the fact of
life unless there is a "consensus" on its value, a state might persuasively
claim that it is free to remove a live human being (e.g., a senile elderly
person) from the law's protection. Just as the Wade Court redefined the
beginning of life as a "process," 322 so too might death be viewed as a
process which may be hastened by those who find that the care of a de-
317. 93 S. Ct. at 732 (emphasis added).
318. Fletcher, The Ethics of Abortion, 14 Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology 1124, 1128
(1971).
319. Fletcher, Indicators of Humanhood: A Tentative Profie of Man, 2 Hastings Center
Report, Nov. 1972, at 1-3.
320. Id. at 3.
321. Fletcher, The Ethics of Abortion, 14 Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology 1124, 1129
(1971).
322. 93 S. Ct. at 731.
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pendent live human being has forced upon them (as the Court said of the
unwanted child in Wade) "a distressful life and future. 3 -3
The prospect of involuntary euthanasia is no mere hobgoblin. It results
directly from the Court's abandonment in Wade of its obligation to resolve
factual issues upon which constitutional rights depend 2 4 The Court's
refusal to decide the crucial question of the fact of life, because of the
lack of a consensus on the meaningfulness or value of life, establishes a
precedent that conceivably could reach as far as legalized involuntary
euthanasia. An editorial in the official journal of the California Medical
Association advocated a new ethic for medicine and society in these terms:
Medicine's role with respect to changing attitudes toward abortion may well be a
prototype of what is to occur.. . . One may anticipate further development of these
roles as the problems of birth control and birth selection are extended inevitably to
death selection and death control whether by the individual or by society. 32
Those who favor "birth selection" and "death selection" by "society" will
be considerably encouraged by Wade.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Every decision to abort is a decision to kill a "live human being,"320 a
"child [with] a separate life," ' - a "human""ae who is "unquestionably
alive"329 and has "an autonomy of development and character."3 0 This is
the stark, overwhelming reality about abortion.
In Wade, the Supreme Court, with full knowledge of the mortal conse-
quences that would ensue, removed a whole class of live human beings
from the law's protection, and left their continued existence to the un-
fettered discretion of others."a But "[h]uman beings are not merely
creatures of the State, and by reason of that fact, our laws should protect
323. Id. at 727.
324. See Part V (A) supra.
325. Editorial, A New Ethic for Medicine and Society, 113 California Medicine 67, 68
(Sept. 1970).
326. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., Supreme Court of the State of New
York, Queens County, Index No. 13113/71, in Juris. State. 60a, 68a (unpublished opinion of
Francis J. Smith, J., Jan. 4, 1972).
327. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 App. Div. 2d 316, 324, 329
N.Y.S.2d 722, 729 (2d Dep't 1972) (citations omitted).
328. Byrn v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 199, 286 N.E.2d 887,
888, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392 (1972).
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. But see Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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the unborn from those who would take his life for purposes of comfort,
convenience, property or peace of mind rather than sanction his demise." ''
Perhaps it is a measure of the extent to which the quality-of-life
philosophy dominates our jurisprudence that a justice of the Supreme
Court can write in the "environmental context" of the destruction of trees
and animals, "any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in
Mankinde,"'33- while in the human context of the destruction of unborn
children, he can opine, contrary to fact, that "the fetus, at most, represents
only the potentiality of life; "834 and proceed to exile the unborn beyond
the pale. But unborn children are also a part of mankind and, aware of it
or not, his opinion did diminish the Court and all the rest of us.
First, Dred Scott, then Buck v. Bell and now the most tragic of them all
-Roe v. Wade. Three generations of error are three too many-and the
last of them shall be called the worst.
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